fix(security): patch SSRF and info disclosure vulnerabilities

go-backend/internal/http/handler/federation.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
 	"sort"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
@@ -635,6 +636,15 @@ func (h *Handler) nodeImport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("Remote URL and Token are required"))
 		return
 	}
+	rURL, err := url.Parse(req.RemoteURL)
+	if err != nil || (rURL.Scheme != "http" && rURL.Scheme != "https") {
+		response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("Invalid Remote URL format"))
+		return
+	}
+	if err := IsSafeRemoteAddr(rURL.Host); err != nil {
+		response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(403, "禁止将远程节点地址设置为内部网络或保留地址"))
+		return
+	}
 
 	domainCfg, _ := h.repo.GetConfigByName("panel_domain")
 	localDomain := ""

go-backend/internal/http/handler/handler.go

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
 )
+
 type Handler struct {
 	repo        *repo.Repository
 	jwtSecret   string
@@ -356,6 +357,12 @@ func (h *Handler) getConfigByName(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("配置名称不能为空"))
 		return
 	}
+	configName := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(req.Name))
+	switch configName {
+	case "license_key", "cloudflare_secret_key", "jwt_secret":
+		response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(403, "禁止访问敏感配置"))
+		return
+	}
 
 	cfg, err := h.repo.GetConfigByName(req.Name)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -381,6 +388,12 @@ func (h *Handler) getConfigs(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(-2, err.Error()))
 		return
 	}
+	ctxClaims := r.Context().Value(middleware.ClaimsContextKey)
+	if claims, ok := ctxClaims.(auth.Claims); !ok || claims.RoleID != 0 {
+		delete(cfgMap, "license_key")
+		delete(cfgMap, "cloudflare_secret_key")
+		delete(cfgMap, "jwt_secret")
+	}
 	response.WriteJSON(w, response.OK(cfgMap))
 }
 
@@ -852,7 +865,7 @@ func (h *Handler) licenseActivate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 				response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("设备绑定失败: "+err.Error()))
 				return
 			}
-			
+
 			// Validation might still fail with scope if we don't query via machine id, but since activate machine succeeded
 			// we can consider the license valid for our simple usecase
 		} else {

go-backend/internal/http/handler/mutations.go

@@ -301,6 +301,10 @@ func (h *Handler) nodeCreate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("节点名称和地址不能为空"))
 		return
 	}
+	if err := IsValidNodeAddress(serverIP); err != nil {
+		response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault(err.Error()))
+		return
+	}
 
 	now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
 	inx := h.repo.NextIndex("node")
@@ -365,6 +369,13 @@ func (h *Handler) nodeUpdate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	newHTTP := asInt(req["http"], currentHTTP)
 	newTLS := asInt(req["tls"], currentTLS)
 	newSocks := asInt(req["socks"], currentSocks)
+	serverIP := asString(req["serverIp"])
+	if serverIP != "" {
+		if err := IsValidNodeAddress(serverIP); err != nil {
+			response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault(err.Error()))
+			return
+		}
+	}
 	if currentStatus == 1 && (newHTTP != currentHTTP || newTLS != currentTLS || newSocks != currentSocks) {
 		if err := h.applyNodeProtocolChange(id, newHTTP, newTLS, newSocks); err != nil {
 			response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault(err.Error()))
@@ -375,7 +386,7 @@ func (h *Handler) nodeUpdate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
 	if err := h.repo.UpdateNode(id,
 		asString(req["name"]),
-		asString(req["serverIp"]),
+		serverIP,
 		nullableText(asString(req["serverIpV4"])),
 		nullableText(asString(req["serverIpV6"])),
 		defaultString(asString(req["port"]), "1000-65535"),
@@ -1686,6 +1697,10 @@ func (h *Handler) forwardCreate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 	if roleID != 0 {
+		if err := IsSafeRemoteAddr(remoteAddr); err != nil {
+			response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(403, "禁止将目标地址设置为内部网络或保留地址"))
+			return
+		}
 		if speedIDVal, ok := req["speedId"]; ok && speedIDVal != nil {
 			response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(-1, "普通用户无法设置限速规则"))
 			return
@@ -1805,6 +1820,12 @@ func (h *Handler) forwardUpdate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	if remoteAddr == "" {
 		remoteAddr = forward.RemoteAddr
 	}
+	if actorRole != 0 {
+		if err := IsSafeRemoteAddr(remoteAddr); err != nil {
+			response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(403, "禁止将目标地址设置为内部网络或保留地址"))
+			return
+		}
+	}
 	strategy := strings.TrimSpace(asString(req["strategy"]))
 	if strategy == "" {
 		strategy = forward.Strategy

go-backend/internal/http/handler/security_utils.go

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+package handler
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// DisableSafeRemoteAddrCheckForTesting allows bypassing the safety check during integration tests.
+var DisableSafeRemoteAddrCheckForTesting = false
+
+// IsSafeRemoteAddr checks if a given address is safe to connect to (prevents SSRF/Open Proxy).
+// It resolves domains to IPs to prevent DNS rebinding attacks pointing to internal networks.
+func IsSafeRemoteAddr(addr string) error {
+	if DisableSafeRemoteAddrCheckForTesting {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "missing port in address") {
+			host = addr
+		} else {
+			return fmt.Errorf("invalid address format: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	ips, err := net.LookupIP(host)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("could not resolve address: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	for _, ip := range ips {
+		if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IsUnspecified() || ip.IsMulticast() {
+			return fmt.Errorf("address resolves to internal or reserved IP: %s", ip.String())
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// IsValidNodeAddress ensures the address is strictly a host or host:port.
+// It explicitly denies schemes (http://, https://), paths (/...), and query params (?).
+func IsValidNodeAddress(addr string) error {
+	addr = strings.TrimSpace(addr)
+	if strings.Contains(addr, "://") {
+		return fmt.Errorf("address must not contain scheme (e.g. http://)")
+	}
+	if strings.ContainsAny(addr, "/?") {
+		return fmt.Errorf("address must not contain path or query parameters")
+	}
+
+	_, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "missing port in address") {
+			return fmt.Errorf("invalid address format")
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}

go-backend/internal/http/middleware/auth.go

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ func requiresAdmin(path string) bool {
 		return true
 	}
 
-	if strings.HasPrefix(path, "/api/v1/federation/share/") {
+	if strings.HasPrefix(path, "/api/v1/federation/share/") || strings.HasPrefix(path, "/api/v1/federation/node/") {
 		return true
 	}
 

go-backend/tests/contract/db_test_helper_test.go

@@ -6,9 +6,14 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
+	"go-backend/internal/http/handler"
 	"go-backend/internal/store/repo"
 )
 
+func init() {
+	handler.DisableSafeRemoteAddrCheckForTesting = true
+}
+
 func mustLastInsertID(t *testing.T, r *repo.Repository, label string) int64 {
 	t.Helper()
 	var id int64