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fix(relay): authenticate endpoints and fail closed on missing routes (#569)
* fix(relay): authenticate endpoints and fail closed on missing routes * fix(tunnel): retain chains until receiver replacement is acknowledged * docs: record final relay security review and validation
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# Relay authentication validation
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Local darwin/arm64 checkout, base 3549fe5. No deploy/push/release or production
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credentials. Three pre-existing investigation tests were preserved.
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## Confirmed seam
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Panel HTTP plus node/federation commands, using temporary SQLite repositories,
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loopback HTTP/WebSocket peers, and captured command data. Native data-plane auth
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matrix is recorded separately in the required-route validation evidence.
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## Vertical regression evidence
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- New local tunnel: observed failure because generated relay connector/receiver
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authentication was absent; implemented purpose-separated endpoint credentials.
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- Required tunnel configuration export: observed missing authentication-policy
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marker; exported marker added, credentials remain excluded. Configuration
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restore of protected tunnels explicitly rejects missing private state.
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- Federation reserve/apply: observed missing capability advertisement; added
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versioned contract, receiver authentication, persistent state, and no-downgrade.
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- Full dual-panel middle/exit tunnel: observed zero authenticated receivers;
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threaded receiving and next-target credentials through consumer requests.
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- Federation strict middle policy: observed absent chain.strict; local and
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federation middle generators now set it while exits retain direct dialing.
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- Insert a new middle before an existing middle: observed rejected update with
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hop-index credentials; receiver identity changed to tunnel/node/role, preserving
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the existing credential and assigning the new receiver a distinct credential.
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- Direct-to-relay conversion: observed absent relay authentication; conversion now
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requires credentials while existing legacy relay tunnels remain explicit.
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- Provider private JSON loss: observed successful reapply recreating protected
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state; separately persisted auth version now rejects missing private material.
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Additional command-seam checks cover local update stability, reconnect followed
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by explicit public batch-redeploy (avoids the 30-second production debounce),
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missing consumer private state rejection, old peer refusal before reservation,
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legacy list visibility, matched per-hop credentials and secret-free list/export.
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## Results
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Eight authentication contract tests with race detection, repeated three times:
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`go test -race ./tests/contract -run '^(TestNewRelayTunnelEmitsMatchingPrivateEndpointAuthentication|TestFederatedRelayRequiresVersionedAuthAndRejectsDowngrade|TestNewFederatedTunnelAuthenticatesEveryRelayHop|TestRelayAuthenticationSurvivesInsertingBeforeExistingMiddle|TestConvertingDirectTunnelRequiresRelayAuthentication|TestBackupImportCannotSilentlyDowngradeRequiredRelay|TestNewRelayTunnelRefusesLegacyFederationBeforeReservation|TestLegacyRelayStateRemainsExplicitInList)$' -count=3`
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Earlier pass: 17.878 seconds. Final run after provider version guard and log
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redaction: PASS, 19.584 seconds. Focused non-TLS generation
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regression passes after narrowing its old overbroad no-metadata assertion.
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`git diff --check` passes.
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## Explicit limitations
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- Authentication-only protection against anonymous relay clients, not credential
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confidentiality over raw TCP/unverified TLS/public-default KCP or insecure
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control-plane paths.
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- Required mode is desired policy, not attestation of every participating agent.
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Old agent strict-route support requires upgrading the agent.
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- Existing legacy relay tunnels remain unprotected. No automatic migration,
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credential rotation, or configuration-only credential recovery is implemented.
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- SQLite/loopback verification only in this task; production topology, live
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upgrades, and PostgreSQL runtime checks are not exercised here.
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