# Two-axis review Fixed base: 3549fe5ad8a6e9b863b3e4f7b9bf738facff87ee plus all task working-tree changes, including new files. The owner approved this scope and subsequently authorized PR submission, merge and the next release tag. Initial review was performed as independent Standards and Spec passes. ## Standards No new hard violations found against applicable AGENTS.md rules. Repository access, explicit table names, migrations, response envelopes and agent extension boundaries comply. Two non-blocking judgement calls: 1. Possible duplicated code: required_relay_transport_test.go repeats the native TCP/TLS/KCP fixture in relay_auth_matrix_investigation_test.go. The historical investigation fixture is deliberately retained separately in this patch, to preserve the original evidence; helper extraction is deferred. 2. Possible speculative generality: buildFederationServiceConfig accepted a variadic credential argument but only used its first item. Fixed by accepting one nullable credential pointer, updating legacy callers explicitly. Focused generator and federation authentication tests pass. Summary: zero hard violations; two low-priority smells, one corrected and one explicitly deferred. ## Spec Three partial requirements found: 1. Create did not take the lifecycle lock, committing a visible tunnel before runtime application. Concurrent delete/edit/reconnect could interleave with stale creation. This violated the create/update/redeploy/delete scope. 2. Federated create held an open database transaction across provider/node acknowledgments, contrary to the no-network-wait-in-transaction requirement. 3. Offline/timeouts and forward synchronization failures could be swallowed as success, contrary to the requirement to expose partial application. These were inherited behaviors within the explicitly promised repair scope, not regressions introduced by the patch. No additional confirmed auth or strict-route defect, and no unjustified scope creep found. Explicit legacy, transport, old-agent and distributed-rollback limits remain documented. Summary: three lifecycle completion gaps, all assigned for correction before publication. Follow-up verification will be appended after the fixes. ## Review-driven recovery additions Follow-up inspection found two additional lifecycle issues during the transaction and pending-state changes: local port reservations must be published before the remote acknowledgment wait, and pending updates must still clean obsolete runtime and reconcile forwards. Both have focused regressions. A cleanup failure must not discard the removed runtime's ownership. Persistent cleanup records are being added in the existing database so retries can identify old endpoints even after desired topology changes. Records are removed only after acknowledgment and are canceled if current desired topology needs the resource again. This is targeted cleanup recovery, not distributed transaction rollback.