fix: harden auth, config access, and backups (#503)

## Summary
- Migrate password storage to bcrypt with legacy MD5 verification-only
support and best-effort upgrade on successful auth.
- Revoke JWTs on auth-state changes, align WebSocket admin auth, and
split public config reads from protected config reads.
- Filter sensitive configs from backup export/import and update contract
coverage for the new security boundaries.

## Test Plan
- [x] `go test ./... -count=1`
- [x] `pnpm run lint`
- [x] `pnpm run build`
This commit is contained in:
sagit
2026-05-14 11:21:45 +08:00
committed by GitHub
29 changed files with 2152 additions and 139 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,377 @@
# FLVX 安全问题修复设计
**日期**: 2026-05-13
**状态**: 待审核
**作者**: AI Assistant
## 概述
针对 PR #502 提到的安全问题,对 FLVX 后端认证、配置访问控制、配置写入保护、备份导出和 JWT 失效模型做一次集中修复。目标是优先消除高风险漏洞,同时保留当前必须兼容的登录页品牌配置读取和验证码兼容行为。
本设计采用“高危项一次收口,结构性问题只分析不重构”的策略:本轮修复 MD5 密码存储、未受控配置读取、敏感配置写入、备份配置泄露和 JWT 长期有效且改密后不失效的问题;不修改“无 Cloudflare secret 时允许当前 captcha 兼容行为”,也不重构 `autoMigrateAll()` 与 `migrateSchema()` 的双迁移入口。
## 背景
当前主线存在以下已确认问题:
1. `login`、`open_api/sub_store`、用户改密、管理员创建用户和管理员修改用户密码仍然使用 `security.MD5(...)`。
2. `/api/v1/config/get` 在 middleware 的 `shouldSkip()` 中被匿名放行,导致任意调用方可以读取绝大多数配置。
3. `updateConfigs()` 与 `updateSingleConfig()` 使用了两套不同的限制逻辑,敏感配置键在单项写接口中未被保护。
4. `ExportAll()` 和 `ExportPartial(types=["configs"])` 会直接导出所有配置,包含 `jwt_secret`、`license_key`、`cloudflare_secret_key`。
5. JWT 当前有效期为 90 天,且 token 在用户改密、禁用、角色变化后仍可继续使用到过期。
同时存在两个重要约束:
1. 登录页和未登录态品牌展示依赖匿名读取 `app_name`、`app_logo`、`app_favicon`、`app_bg_image` 和 `cloudflare_site_key`。
2. `tests/contract/migration_contract_test.go` 已把“无 Cloudflare secret 时允许当前 captcha 兼容行为”定义为既有契约,本轮不改变。
## 目标
1. 新增和更新后的用户密码不再以 MD5 存储。
2. 历史 MD5 用户可在首次成功认证时自动迁移到强哈希。
3. 匿名请求不能再读取任意配置,只能读取明确的公开配置白名单。
4. 通用配置写接口不能覆盖敏感配置键。
5. 备份导出默认不泄露敏感配置明文。
6. 用户改密、禁用或角色变化后,旧 JWT 应立即失效。
7. 不破坏现有登录页品牌展示和 captcha 兼容行为。
## 非目标
1. 不重构 `open_api/sub_store` 的整体认证模型;该接口仍使用现有用户名和密码查询参数语义。
2. 不实现完整 refresh token、session 管理后台或 token 黑名单体系。
3. 不改变“无 Cloudflare secret 时允许当前 captcha 兼容行为”。
4. 不在本轮重构 `autoMigrateAll()` 与 `migrateSchema()` 的启动流程。
5. 不引入前端测试框架。
## 影响范围
### 后端
- `go-backend/internal/security/`
- `go-backend/internal/auth/jwt.go`
- `go-backend/internal/http/middleware/auth.go`
- `go-backend/internal/http/handler/handler.go`
- `go-backend/internal/http/handler/mutations.go`
- `go-backend/internal/store/model/model.go`
- `go-backend/internal/store/repo/repository.go`
- `go-backend/internal/store/repo/repository_mutations.go`
- `go-backend/tests/contract/`
- `go-backend/internal/store/repo/*_test.go`
### 前端
- `vite-frontend/src/api/index.ts`
- `vite-frontend/src/config/site.ts`
- `vite-frontend/src/pages/index.tsx`
- 任何在未登录态读取品牌配置的组件
## 设计决策
### 已确认决策
1. 本轮采用安全优先策略,允许收紧危险默认行为。
2. MD5 密码采用“登录成功时自动迁移”的兼容方案。
3. captcha 在未配置 Cloudflare secret 时的兼容行为保持不变。
4. JWT 采用“最小可撤销”方案,而不是完整 session 体系。
5. 双重迁移系统只分析,不在本轮中修改。
### 迁移系统分析结论
`autoMigrateAll()` 与 `migrateSchema()` 当前职责并不相同:
1. `autoMigrateAll()` 负责表和列结构补齐。
2. `migrateSchema()` 负责基于 `schema_version` 的数据修正,以及 PostgreSQL ID 默认值修复等兼容迁移。
3. 现有 `repository_migrate_test.go` 已明确覆盖这两部分逻辑,说明它们在现有代码库中是被依赖的互补结构,而不是已确认的重复安全漏洞。
因此本轮仅记录该分析结论,不把双迁移入口纳入改动范围,避免把安全修复扩展为启动流程重构。
## 详细设计
### 1. 密码存储与认证迁移
在 `internal/security/` 中新增统一密码能力,替代各处直接使用 `security.MD5(...)` 的做法。
建议新增以下接口:
```go
func HashPassword(plain string) (string, error)
func VerifyPassword(storedHash, plain string) (ok bool, legacy bool)
func IsLegacyPasswordHash(storedHash string) bool
```
哈希算法使用 `bcrypt`:
1. `user.pwd` 当前为 `varchar(100)`,足以容纳 bcrypt 哈希。
2. 不需要修改密码列长度,改动最小。
3. 对当前 Go 后端来说,bcrypt 是最稳妥的强哈希升级路径。
所有密码入口统一改为走这套能力:
1. `login`
2. `openAPISubStore`
3. `updatePassword`
4. `userCreate`
5. `userUpdate` 中的管理员改密路径
认证迁移规则:
1. 如果数据库中存的是 bcrypt,则按 bcrypt 校验。
2. 如果数据库中存的是历史 MD5,则先按旧逻辑校验。
3. 历史 MD5 校验成功后,立即把 `pwd` 改写为 bcrypt。
4. 自动迁移不仅在网页登录时执行,也在 `open_api/sub_store` 成功鉴权时执行,避免只使用订阅接口的老用户永远停留在 MD5。
默认管理员种子账号仍保留当前默认密码语义和 `requirePasswordChange` 行为,但种子哈希改为 bcrypt,不再在新建数据库中写入 MD5 值。
### 2. JWT 最小可撤销方案
本轮不引入 refresh token 和黑名单表,而是做一个可以立即生效的最小撤销闭环。
#### 数据模型
在 `user` 表新增字段:
- `password_changed_at BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0`
该字段专门表示密码最后一次变更时间,不能复用现有 `updated_time`,原因是 `updated_time` 还会被流量、状态或其他用户资料更新触发,复用后会让非密码更新错误地使 token 失效。
#### token 签发与校验
继续使用现有 `iat` 声明,但把有效期从 90 天收紧到 7 天。
token 校验分两步:
1. 先做现有签名和过期时间校验。
2. 再读取用户最小认证状态,确认:
- 用户仍存在
- 用户状态未被禁用
- 当前 `role_id` 与 token 中一致
- `claims.iat` 不早于 `password_changed_at`
为避免 middleware 每次都查询完整用户对象,Repository 新增专用读取方法,只返回 token 校验需要的最小字段,例如:
```go
type UserAuthState struct {
ID int64
RoleID int
Status int
PasswordChangedAt int64
}
func (r *Repository) GetUserAuthState(userID int64) (*UserAuthState, error)
```
#### 失效语义
以下场景下,旧 token 应立即失效:
1. 用户修改密码
2. 管理员修改用户密码
3. 用户被禁用
4. 用户角色发生变化
这会带来一次明确的兼容收紧:升级完成后,部分历史 token 可能因为寿命策略或认证状态变化而失效,这是安全优先下的可接受行为。
### 3. 配置读取访问控制
为了避免继续让 `/api/v1/config/get` 承担“有时匿名、有时鉴权”的混合语义,本设计将公开配置读取拆成单独的 public 端点。
#### 端点设计
保留现有受保护端点:
- `POST /api/v1/config/get`
新增公开端点:
- `POST /api/v1/public/config/get`
middleware 仅对白名单 public 端点放行,不再放行 `/api/v1/config/get`。
#### 公开白名单
匿名仅允许读取以下配置:
1. `app_name`
2. `app_logo`
3. `app_favicon`
4. `app_bg_image`
5. `cloudflare_site_key`
理由:
1. 登录页与未登录态品牌渲染依赖前四项。
2. 登录页在 captcha 开启时需要读取 `cloudflare_site_key`。
3. 其他配置不应暴露给匿名方。
前端调整规则:
1. 登录页和 `site.ts` 中的未登录态品牌配置读取改走 `/public/config/get`。
2. 登录后页面仍使用现有 `/config/get` 或 `/config/list`。
3. 已登录页面中的配置读取逻辑不变,只是恢复为真正受 JWT 保护。
### 4. 配置写保护统一
当前 `updateConfigs()` 与 `updateSingleConfig()` 各自维护不同限制逻辑,是本次越权写入漏洞的根源。本轮把配置访问规则统一收口为一套辅助函数。
建议新增配置策略定义:
```go
type ConfigAccessPolicy struct {
PublicReadable bool
Sensitive bool
CommercialOnly bool
}
```
由统一函数返回某个 key 的策略,再由:
1. `public config get`
2. `config get`
3. `config list`
4. `updateConfigs()`
5. `updateSingleConfig()`
共同复用。
敏感配置键至少包含:
1. `jwt_secret`
2. `license_key`
3. `cloudflare_secret_key`
这些键的写入规则:
1. 不允许通过通用配置写接口改写。
2. 不允许通过公开读取接口读取。
3. 非管理员在配置列表接口中也不能获得。
商业版白名单键继续沿用现有语义,例如:
1. `app_name`
2. `app_logo`
3. `app_favicon`
4. `hide_footer_brand`
但其判断逻辑同样统一走同一套策略函数,避免再次出现单接口漏判。
### 5. 备份导出与导入脱敏
备份系统改为“默认安全导出”,而不是“完整明文镜像”。
#### 导出
`ExportAll()` 和 `ExportPartial(types=["configs"])` 在写入 `backup.Configs` 前都先经过统一过滤函数,移除敏感配置键。
敏感配置键与配置写保护列表保持一致:
1. `jwt_secret`
2. `license_key`
3. `cloudflare_secret_key`
#### 导入
导入配置时,即使旧备份中带有上述敏感键,也会在导入前被丢弃,不允许通过备份恢复路径覆盖在线安全配置。
该设计的取舍如下:
1. 保留大部分业务配置、节点、转发、用户数据的恢复能力。
2. 不再把备份文件当作核心密钥分发载体。
3. `UserBackup.Pwd` 仍然保留,以维持用户恢复语义;在本轮密码升级后,这些值将是 bcrypt 哈希,而不是 MD5。
### 6. captcha 兼容行为
`captcha_enabled`、`cloudflare_site_key`、`cloudflare_secret_key` 的现有兼容行为保持不变。
明确保持以下现状:
1. 当未完整配置 Cloudflare key 时,当前 contract test 约定的兼容路径继续存在。
2. 本轮不把 captcha 兼容逻辑从“兼容旧行为”切换为“严格校验”。
这样可以避免把一轮安全修复扩展成登录流程行为变更,同时与用户已确认的范围保持一致。
## 错误处理与兼容行为
### 错误处理
保持现有 API envelope:`{code, msg, data, ts}`。
建议的接口行为:
1. `POST /api/v1/public/config/get` 请求非公开 key 时返回 `403`。
2. 受保护配置端点未登录时返回 `401`。
3. 登录、订阅接口、改密接口继续返回通用认证失败,不暴露“用户名存在但密码错误”等细节。
4. token 因签名错误、过期、改密、禁用或角色变化失效时,统一返回现有 `401` 语义。
5. 备份导入中出现敏感配置键时,接口整体仍允许成功导入其他数据,敏感键静默忽略。
### 保留兼容
1. 登录页和未登录态品牌展示继续可用。
2. 未配置 Cloudflare secret 时的 captcha 兼容逻辑继续保留。
3. 历史 MD5 用户仍可继续认证,并在成功后自动迁移。
### 刻意收紧
1. 匿名方不再可读取任意配置。
2. 通用配置写接口不再能写入敏感键。
3. 备份不再导出敏感配置明文。
4. 改密、禁用和角色变化会立即使旧 token 失效。
## 测试设计
本轮以 Go 单测和 contract test 为主,覆盖以下场景。
### 密码迁移
1. 历史 MD5 用户在网页登录成功后,数据库中的 `pwd` 被升级为 bcrypt。
2. 历史 MD5 用户在 `open_api/sub_store` 成功鉴权后,同样触发迁移。
3. 新建用户后落库的是 bcrypt,而不是 MD5。
4. 管理员修改用户密码和用户自助改密后,落库的是 bcrypt。
### JWT 最小可撤销
1. 正常 token 仍可访问受保护接口。
2. 改密后旧 token 失效。
3. 用户被禁用后旧 token 失效。
4. 用户角色变化后旧 token 失效。
5. 过期 token 失效。
### 配置访问控制
1. 匿名访问公开配置成功。
2. 匿名访问非公开配置失败。
3. 已登录页面需要的普通配置读取仍然可用。
4. `updateSingleConfig()` 无法修改敏感键。
5. `updateConfigs()` 同样无法修改敏感键。
### 备份脱敏
1. `ExportAll()` 不包含敏感配置。
2. `ExportPartial(types=["configs"])` 不包含敏感配置。
3. 导入带敏感键的备份时,这些键不会被写回数据库。
4. 非敏感配置和其他业务数据仍可正常导入导出。
### 迁移系统回归
1. 现有 `repository_migrate_test.go` 保持通过。
2. 本轮不对 `autoMigrateAll()` 与 `migrateSchema()` 的职责边界做行为性改动。
## 验收标准
1. 数据库中不再新增 MD5 密码。
2. 历史 MD5 用户可在首次成功认证后自动升级到 bcrypt。
3. 匿名调用方不能再读取非公开配置。
4. `updateSingleConfig()` 和 `updateConfigs()` 都无法改写敏感配置键。
5. 备份导出默认不包含 `jwt_secret`、`license_key`、`cloudflare_secret_key`。
6. 改密、禁用和角色变化后,旧 JWT 立即失效。
7. 登录页品牌展示和 captcha 兼容行为不被破坏。
8. 现有迁移测试和本轮新增安全测试全部通过。
## PR #502 处置
PR #502 的价值在于指出了真实问题,但其实现方式只是把讽刺性注释写进生产代码,并未修复漏洞。因此该 PR 不应合并。
执行阶段的处置方式:
1. 关闭 PR #502。
2. 在关闭说明中指出:问题成立,但修复将通过正式代码与测试提交完成,而不是通过向源文件加入讽刺性注释。
3. 后续在新提交中按本设计逐项修复。
+7 -2
View File
@@ -12,12 +12,13 @@ import (
const (
algorithm = "HmacSHA256"
expireTime = 90 * 24 * time.Hour
expireTime = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
)
type Claims struct {
Sub string `json:"sub"`
Iat int64 `json:"iat"`
IatMs int64 `json:"iat_ms"`
Exp int64 `json:"exp"`
User string `json:"user"`
Name string `json:"name"`
@@ -30,11 +31,15 @@ type tokenHeader struct {
}
func GenerateToken(userID int64, username string, roleID int, secret string) (string, error) {
now := time.Now()
return GenerateTokenAt(userID, username, roleID, secret, time.Now())
}
func GenerateTokenAt(userID int64, username string, roleID int, secret string, now time.Time) (string, error) {
header := tokenHeader{Alg: algorithm, Typ: "JWT"}
claims := Claims{
Sub: strconv.FormatInt(userID, 10),
Iat: now.Unix(),
IatMs: now.UnixMilli(),
Exp: now.Add(expireTime).Unix(),
User: username,
Name: username,
+8
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
package auth
type UserAuthState struct {
ID int64
RoleID int
Status int
PasswordChangedAt int64
}
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
package handler
import (
"net/http"
"strings"
"go-backend/internal/http/response"
"go-backend/internal/store/repo"
)
func (h *Handler) getPublicConfigByName(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("请求失败"))
return
}
var req nameRequest
if err := decodeJSON(r.Body, &req); err != nil {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("配置名称不能为空"))
return
}
configName := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(req.Name))
if configName == "" {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("配置名称不能为空"))
return
}
if !repo.IsPublicConfigKey(configName) {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(403, "禁止访问敏感配置"))
return
}
cfg, err := h.repo.GetConfigByName(configName)
if err != nil {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(-2, err.Error()))
return
}
if cfg == nil {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("配置不存在"))
return
}
response.WriteJSON(w, response.OK(cfg))
}
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
package handler
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"go-backend/internal/auth"
"go-backend/internal/http/middleware"
"go-backend/internal/http/response"
"go-backend/internal/store/repo"
)
func TestPublicConfigGetAllowsBrandKeys(t *testing.T) {
router, r := setupConfigAccessTestRouter(t)
seedConfigValue(t, r, "app_name", "FLVX Brand")
seedConfigValue(t, r, "app_logo", "logo-data")
seedConfigValue(t, r, "app_favicon", "favicon-data")
seedConfigValue(t, r, "app_bg_image", "bg-data")
seedConfigValue(t, r, "cloudflare_site_key", "site-key")
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/public/config/get", bytes.NewBufferString(`{"name":"app_name"}`))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
assertHandlerCode(t, resp, 0)
}
func TestPublicConfigGetRejectsSensitiveKeys(t *testing.T) {
router, _ := setupConfigAccessTestRouter(t)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/public/config/get", bytes.NewBufferString(`{"name":"jwt_secret"}`))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
assertHandlerCodeMsg(t, resp, 403, "禁止访问敏感配置")
}
func TestConfigGetNowRequiresAuth(t *testing.T) {
router, _ := setupConfigAccessTestRouter(t)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/config/get", bytes.NewBufferString(`{"name":"app_name"}`))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
assertHandlerCodeMsg(t, resp, 401, "未登录或token已过期")
}
func TestConfigUpdateRejectsSensitiveKeys(t *testing.T) {
router, _ := setupConfigAccessTestRouter(t)
adminToken := mustGenerateConfigAccessToken(t, 1, "admin_user", 0)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/config/update", bytes.NewBufferString(`{"jwt_secret":"rotated-secret"}`))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("Authorization", adminToken)
resp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
assertHandlerCodeMsg(t, resp, 403, "禁止访问敏感配置")
}
func TestConfigUpdateSingleRejectsSensitiveKeys(t *testing.T) {
router, _ := setupConfigAccessTestRouter(t)
adminToken := mustGenerateConfigAccessToken(t, 1, "admin_user", 0)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/config/update-single", bytes.NewBufferString(`{"name":"jwt_secret","value":"rotated-secret"}`))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("Authorization", adminToken)
resp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
assertHandlerCodeMsg(t, resp, 403, "禁止访问敏感配置")
}
func setupConfigAccessTestRouter(t *testing.T) (http.Handler, *repo.Repository) {
t.Helper()
r, err := repo.Open(t.TempDir() + "/config-access.db")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open sqlite: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = r.Close()
})
h := New(r, "unit-test-secret")
mux := http.NewServeMux()
h.Register(mux)
wrapped := middleware.Recover(mux)
wrapped = middleware.JWT(middleware.AuthOptions{JWTSecret: "unit-test-secret", GetUserAuthState: h.GetUserAuthState})(wrapped)
wrapped = middleware.RequestLog(wrapped)
wrapped = middleware.CORS(wrapped)
return wrapped, r
}
func seedConfigValue(t *testing.T, r *repo.Repository, name, value string) {
t.Helper()
if err := r.DB().Exec(`INSERT INTO vite_config(name, value, time) VALUES(?, ?, 0) ON CONFLICT(name) DO UPDATE SET value = excluded.value, time = excluded.time`, name, value).Error; err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed config %s: %v", name, err)
}
}
func mustGenerateConfigAccessToken(t *testing.T, userID int64, username string, roleID int) string {
t.Helper()
token, err := auth.GenerateToken(userID, username, roleID, "unit-test-secret")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
return token
}
func assertHandlerCode(t *testing.T, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder, expected int) {
t.Helper()
var out response.R
if err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&out); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode response: %v", err)
}
if out.Code != expected {
t.Fatalf("expected code %d, got %d", expected, out.Code)
}
}
func assertHandlerCodeMsg(t *testing.T, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder, expectedCode int, expectedMsg string) {
t.Helper()
var out response.R
if err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&out); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode response: %v", err)
}
if out.Code != expectedCode || out.Msg != expectedMsg {
t.Fatalf("expected (%d,%q), got (%d,%q)", expectedCode, expectedMsg, out.Code, out.Msg)
}
}
+55 -5
View File
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ func New(repo *repo.Repository, jwtSecret string) *Handler {
}
h.metrics.RecordNodeMetric(nodeID, metricInfo)
})
h.wsServer.SetUserAuthStateLookup(h.GetUserAuthState)
return h
}
@@ -143,6 +144,10 @@ func (h *Handler) WebSocketHandler() http.Handler {
return h.wsServer
}
func (h *Handler) GetUserAuthState(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error) {
return h.repo.GetUserAuthState(userID)
}
func (h *Handler) Register(mux *http.ServeMux) {
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/user/login", h.login)
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/user/list", h.userList)
@@ -152,6 +157,7 @@ func (h *Handler) Register(mux *http.ServeMux) {
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/user/reset", h.userResetFlow)
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/user/quota/reset", h.userQuotaReset)
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/user/groups", h.userGroups)
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/public/config/get", h.getPublicConfigByName)
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/config/get", h.getConfigByName)
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/config/list", h.getConfigs)
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/config/update", h.updateConfigs)
@@ -334,7 +340,8 @@ func (h *Handler) login(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("账号或密码错误"))
return
}
if user.Pwd != security.MD5(req.Password) {
passwordMatched, passwordWasLegacy := security.VerifyPassword(user.Pwd, req.Password)
if !passwordMatched {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("账号或密码错误"))
return
}
@@ -342,8 +349,20 @@ func (h *Handler) login(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("账号被停用"))
return
}
issueAt := time.Now()
if passwordWasLegacy {
updatedAt := time.Now().UnixMilli()
hashedPassword, err := security.HashPassword(req.Password)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("legacy password rehash skipped user_id=%d path=login err=%v", user.ID, err)
} else if err := h.repo.UpdateUserPassword(user.ID, hashedPassword, updatedAt); err != nil {
log.Printf("legacy password rehash update skipped user_id=%d path=login err=%v", user.ID, err)
} else {
issueAt = time.UnixMilli(updatedAt + 1)
}
}
token, err := auth.GenerateToken(user.ID, user.User, user.RoleID, h.jwtSecret)
token, err := auth.GenerateTokenAt(user.ID, user.User, user.RoleID, h.jwtSecret, issueAt)
if err != nil {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(-2, err.Error()))
return
@@ -557,10 +576,27 @@ func (h *Handler) openAPISubStore(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(-2, err.Error()))
return
}
if user == nil || user.Pwd != security.MD5(password) {
if user == nil {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("鉴权失败"))
return
}
passwordMatched, passwordWasLegacy := security.VerifyPassword(user.Pwd, password)
if !passwordMatched {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("鉴权失败"))
return
}
if user.Status == 0 {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("账号被停用"))
return
}
if passwordWasLegacy {
hashedPassword, err := security.HashPassword(password)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("legacy password rehash skipped user_id=%d path=sub_store err=%v", user.ID, err)
} else if err := h.repo.UpdateUserPassword(user.ID, hashedPassword, time.Now().UnixMilli()); err != nil {
log.Printf("legacy password rehash update skipped user_id=%d path=sub_store err=%v", user.ID, err)
}
}
const giga = int64(1024 * 1024 * 1024)
headerValue := ""
@@ -948,6 +984,10 @@ func (h *Handler) updateConfigs(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if key == "" {
continue
}
if repo.IsSensitiveConfigKey(key) {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(403, "禁止访问敏感配置"))
return
}
if protectedKeys[key] && isCommercial != "true" {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("需要商业版授权"))
@@ -985,6 +1025,10 @@ func (h *Handler) updateSingleConfig(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("配置名称不能为空"))
return
}
if repo.IsSensitiveConfigKey(name) {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(403, "禁止访问敏感配置"))
return
}
isCommercial, _ := h.repo.GetViteConfigValue("is_commercial")
if (name == "app_name" || name == "app_logo" || name == "app_favicon" || name == "hide_footer_brand") && isCommercial != "true" {
@@ -1255,7 +1299,8 @@ func (h *Handler) updatePassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
if user.Pwd != security.MD5(req.CurrentPassword) {
passwordMatched, _ := security.VerifyPassword(user.Pwd, req.CurrentPassword)
if !passwordMatched {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.ErrDefault("当前密码错误"))
return
}
@@ -1270,7 +1315,12 @@ func (h *Handler) updatePassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
if err := h.repo.UpdateUserNameAndPassword(userID, req.NewUsername, security.MD5(req.NewPassword), time.Now().UnixMilli()); err != nil {
hashedPassword, err := security.HashPassword(req.NewPassword)
if err != nil {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(-2, err.Error()))
return
}
if err := h.repo.UpdateUserNameAndPassword(userID, req.NewUsername, hashedPassword, time.Now().UnixMilli()); err != nil {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(-2, err.Error()))
return
}
+12 -2
View File
@@ -71,7 +71,12 @@ func (h *Handler) userCreate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
maxConn := asInt(req["maxConn"], 0)
userID, err := h.repo.CreateUser(username, security.MD5(pwd), roleID, expTime, flow, flowResetTime, num, status, maxConn, now)
hashedPassword, err := security.HashPassword(pwd)
if err != nil {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(-2, err.Error()))
return
}
userID, err := h.repo.CreateUser(username, hashedPassword, roleID, expTime, flow, flowResetTime, num, status, maxConn, now)
if err != nil {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(-2, err.Error()))
return
@@ -176,7 +181,12 @@ func (h *Handler) userUpdate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
} else {
if err := h.repo.UpdateUserWithPassword(id, username, security.MD5(pwd), flow, num, expTime, flowResetTime, status, maxConn, now); err != nil {
hashedPassword, err := security.HashPassword(pwd)
if err != nil {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(-2, err.Error()))
return
}
if err := h.repo.UpdateUserWithPassword(id, username, hashedPassword, flow, num, expTime, flowResetTime, status, maxConn, now); err != nil {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(-2, err.Error()))
return
}
+19 -2
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package middleware
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"go-backend/internal/auth"
@@ -14,7 +15,8 @@ type contextKey string
const ClaimsContextKey contextKey = "claims"
type AuthOptions struct {
JWTSecret string
JWTSecret string
GetUserAuthState func(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error)
}
func JWT(opts AuthOptions) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
@@ -42,6 +44,19 @@ func JWT(opts AuthOptions) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return
}
if opts.GetUserAuthState != nil {
userID, err := strconv.ParseInt(claims.Sub, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(401, "无效的token或token已过期"))
return
}
state, err := opts.GetUserAuthState(userID)
if err != nil || state == nil || state.Status != 1 || state.RoleID != claims.RoleID || claims.IatMs <= state.PasswordChangedAt {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(401, "无效的token或token已过期"))
return
}
}
if requiresAdmin(r.URL.Path) && claims.RoleID != 0 {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.Err(403, "权限不足,仅管理员可操作"))
return
@@ -78,9 +93,11 @@ func shouldSkip(path string) bool {
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/api/v1/captcha/"):
return true
case path == "/api/v1/config/get":
return true
return false
case path == "/api/v1/user/login":
return true
case path == "/api/v1/public/config/get":
return true
case path == "/api/v1/federation/connect":
return true
case path == "/api/v1/federation/tunnel/create":
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
package middleware
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
"go-backend/internal/auth"
"go-backend/internal/http/response"
)
func TestJWTRejectsPasswordChangedToken(t *testing.T) {
secret := "unit-test-secret"
token, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
claims, err := auth.ParseClaims(token, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse claims: %v", err)
}
wrapped := JWT(AuthOptions{
JWTSecret: secret,
GetUserAuthState: func(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error) {
return &auth.UserAuthState{ID: userID, RoleID: 0, Status: 1, PasswordChangedAt: claims.IatMs + 1}, nil
},
})(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.OK("pass"))
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/tunnel/list", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", token)
res := httptest.NewRecorder()
wrapped.ServeHTTP(res, req)
assertAuthDenied(t, res)
}
func TestJWTAcceptsCurrentUserState(t *testing.T) {
secret := "unit-test-secret"
token, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
claims, err := auth.ParseClaims(token, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse claims: %v", err)
}
wrapped := JWT(AuthOptions{
JWTSecret: secret,
GetUserAuthState: func(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error) {
return &auth.UserAuthState{ID: userID, RoleID: 0, Status: 1, PasswordChangedAt: claims.IatMs - 1}, nil
},
})(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.OK("pass"))
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/tunnel/list", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", token)
res := httptest.NewRecorder()
wrapped.ServeHTTP(res, req)
assertCode(t, res, 0)
}
func TestJWTRejectsDisabledUserToken(t *testing.T) {
secret := "unit-test-secret"
token, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
wrapped := JWT(AuthOptions{
JWTSecret: secret,
GetUserAuthState: func(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error) {
return &auth.UserAuthState{ID: userID, RoleID: 0, Status: 0, PasswordChangedAt: time.Now().Unix()}, nil
},
})(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.OK("pass"))
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/tunnel/list", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", token)
res := httptest.NewRecorder()
wrapped.ServeHTTP(res, req)
assertAuthDenied(t, res)
}
func TestJWTRejectsPasswordChangedAtSameMillisecond(t *testing.T) {
secret := "unit-test-secret"
token, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
claims, err := auth.ParseClaims(token, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse claims: %v", err)
}
wrapped := JWT(AuthOptions{
JWTSecret: secret,
GetUserAuthState: func(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error) {
return &auth.UserAuthState{ID: userID, RoleID: 0, Status: 1, PasswordChangedAt: claims.IatMs}, nil
},
})(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.OK("pass"))
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/tunnel/list", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", token)
res := httptest.NewRecorder()
wrapped.ServeHTTP(res, req)
assertAuthDenied(t, res)
}
func TestJWTRejectsRoleMismatch(t *testing.T) {
secret := "unit-test-secret"
token, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
wrapped := JWT(AuthOptions{
JWTSecret: secret,
GetUserAuthState: func(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error) {
return &auth.UserAuthState{ID: userID, RoleID: 1, Status: 1, PasswordChangedAt: 0}, nil
},
})(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.OK("pass"))
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/tunnel/list", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", token)
res := httptest.NewRecorder()
wrapped.ServeHTTP(res, req)
assertAuthDenied(t, res)
}
func TestJWTRejectsMissingUserState(t *testing.T) {
secret := "unit-test-secret"
token, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
wrapped := JWT(AuthOptions{
JWTSecret: secret,
GetUserAuthState: func(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error) {
return nil, nil
},
})(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.OK("pass"))
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/tunnel/list", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", token)
res := httptest.NewRecorder()
wrapped.ServeHTTP(res, req)
assertAuthDenied(t, res)
}
func TestJWTRejectsAuthStateLookupError(t *testing.T) {
secret := "unit-test-secret"
token, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
wrapped := JWT(AuthOptions{
JWTSecret: secret,
GetUserAuthState: func(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error) {
return nil, errors.New("boom")
},
})(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.OK("pass"))
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/tunnel/list", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", token)
res := httptest.NewRecorder()
wrapped.ServeHTTP(res, req)
assertAuthDenied(t, res)
}
func TestShouldSkipDoesNotBypassConfigGet(t *testing.T) {
if shouldSkip("/api/v1/config/get") {
t.Fatal("expected /api/v1/config/get to require auth")
}
}
func TestShouldSkipBypassesPublicConfigGet(t *testing.T) {
if !shouldSkip("/api/v1/public/config/get") {
t.Fatal("expected /api/v1/public/config/get to remain public")
}
}
func TestJWTExpiresAfterSevenDays(t *testing.T) {
secret := "unit-test-secret"
token, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
claims, err := auth.ParseClaims(token, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse claims: %v", err)
}
if got := claims.Exp - claims.Iat; got != int64(7*24*time.Hour/time.Second) {
t.Fatalf("expected 7 day token lifetime, got %d seconds", got)
}
if claims.IatMs <= 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected millisecond issuance time to be populated, got %d", claims.IatMs)
}
}
func assertCode(t *testing.T, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder, expected int) {
t.Helper()
var out response.R
if err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&out); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode response: %v", err)
}
if out.Code != expected {
t.Fatalf("expected code %d, got %d", expected, out.Code)
}
}
func assertAuthDenied(t *testing.T, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder) {
t.Helper()
assertCodeMsg(t, rec, 401, "无效的token或token已过期")
}
func assertCodeMsg(t *testing.T, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder, expectedCode int, expectedMsg string) {
t.Helper()
var out response.R
if err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&out); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode response: %v", err)
}
if out.Code != expectedCode || out.Msg != expectedMsg {
t.Fatalf("expected (%d,%q), got (%d,%q)", expectedCode, expectedMsg, out.Code, out.Msg)
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ func NewRouter(h *handler.Handler, jwtSecret string) http.Handler {
mux.Handle("/system-info", h.WebSocketHandler())
wrapped := middleware.Recover(mux)
wrapped = middleware.JWT(middleware.AuthOptions{JWTSecret: jwtSecret})(wrapped)
wrapped = middleware.JWT(middleware.AuthOptions{JWTSecret: jwtSecret, GetUserAuthState: h.GetUserAuthState})(wrapped)
wrapped = middleware.RequestLog(wrapped)
wrapped = middleware.CORS(wrapped)
return wrapped
+39
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
package security
import (
"strings"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
)
func HashPassword(plain string) (string, error) {
hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(plain), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return string(hash), nil
}
func VerifyPassword(storedHash, plain string) (bool, bool) {
if strings.HasPrefix(storedHash, "$2") {
return bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(storedHash), []byte(plain)) == nil, false
}
if MD5(plain) == storedHash {
return true, true
}
return false, false
}
func IsLegacyPasswordHash(storedHash string) bool {
storedHash = strings.TrimSpace(storedHash)
if len(storedHash) != 32 {
return false
}
for _, r := range storedHash {
if (r >= '0' && r <= '9') || (r >= 'a' && r <= 'f') || (r >= 'A' && r <= 'F') {
continue
}
return false
}
return true
}
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
package security
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestHashPasswordProducesBcrypt(t *testing.T) {
hash, err := HashPassword("admin_user")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HashPassword() error = %v", err)
}
if len(hash) < 50 || !strings.HasPrefix(hash, "$2") {
t.Fatalf("expected bcrypt hash, got %q", hash)
}
if ok, legacy := VerifyPassword(hash, "admin_user"); !ok || legacy {
t.Fatalf("VerifyPassword() = (%v,%v), want (true,false)", ok, legacy)
}
}
func TestVerifyPasswordAcceptsLegacyMD5(t *testing.T) {
if ok, legacy := VerifyPassword("3c85cdebade1c51cf64ca9f3c09d182d", "admin_user"); !ok || !legacy {
t.Fatalf("VerifyPassword() = (%v,%v), want (true,true)", ok, legacy)
}
}
func TestIsLegacyPasswordHash(t *testing.T) {
if !IsLegacyPasswordHash("3c85cdebade1c51cf64ca9f3c09d182d") {
t.Fatal("expected 32-char hex MD5 hash to be legacy")
}
hash, err := HashPassword("admin_user")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HashPassword() error = %v", err)
}
if IsLegacyPasswordHash(hash) {
t.Fatalf("expected bcrypt hash not to be legacy: %q", hash)
}
}
+15 -14
View File
@@ -10,20 +10,21 @@ import "database/sql"
// User maps to the "user" table. PostgreSQL treats "user" as a reserved
// word, so TableName() is required for correct quoting.
type User struct {
ID int64 `gorm:"primaryKey;autoIncrement"`
User string `gorm:"column:user;type:varchar(100);not null"`
Pwd string `gorm:"type:varchar(100);not null"`
RoleID int `gorm:"column:role_id;not null"`
ExpTime int64 `gorm:"column:exp_time;not null"`
Flow int64 `gorm:"not null"`
InFlow int64 `gorm:"column:in_flow;not null;default:0"`
OutFlow int64 `gorm:"column:out_flow;not null;default:0"`
FlowResetTime int64 `gorm:"column:flow_reset_time;not null"`
Num int `gorm:"not null"`
CreatedTime int64 `gorm:"column:created_time;not null"`
UpdatedTime sql.NullInt64 `gorm:"column:updated_time"`
Status int `gorm:"not null"`
MaxConn int `gorm:"column:max_conn;not null;default:0"`
ID int64 `gorm:"primaryKey;autoIncrement"`
User string `gorm:"column:user;type:varchar(100);not null"`
Pwd string `gorm:"type:varchar(100);not null"`
RoleID int `gorm:"column:role_id;not null"`
ExpTime int64 `gorm:"column:exp_time;not null"`
Flow int64 `gorm:"not null"`
InFlow int64 `gorm:"column:in_flow;not null;default:0"`
OutFlow int64 `gorm:"column:out_flow;not null;default:0"`
FlowResetTime int64 `gorm:"column:flow_reset_time;not null"`
Num int `gorm:"not null"`
CreatedTime int64 `gorm:"column:created_time;not null"`
UpdatedTime sql.NullInt64 `gorm:"column:updated_time"`
Status int `gorm:"not null"`
PasswordChangedAt int64 `gorm:"column:password_changed_at;not null;default:0"`
MaxConn int `gorm:"column:max_conn;not null;default:0"`
}
func (User) TableName() string { return "user" }
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
package repo
import "strings"
type ConfigAccessPolicy string
const (
ConfigAccessPublic ConfigAccessPolicy = "public"
ConfigAccessSensitive ConfigAccessPolicy = "sensitive"
)
var publicConfigKeys = map[string]struct{}{
"app_name": {},
"app_logo": {},
"app_favicon": {},
"app_bg_image": {},
"cloudflare_site_key": {},
}
var sensitiveConfigKeys = map[string]struct{}{
"jwt_secret": {},
"license_key": {},
"cloudflare_secret_key": {},
}
func PolicyForConfig(name string) ConfigAccessPolicy {
if IsPublicConfigKey(name) {
return ConfigAccessPublic
}
if IsSensitiveConfigKey(name) {
return ConfigAccessSensitive
}
return ConfigAccessSensitive
}
func IsPublicConfigKey(name string) bool {
_, ok := publicConfigKeys[normalizeConfigKey(name)]
return ok
}
func IsSensitiveConfigKey(name string) bool {
_, ok := sensitiveConfigKeys[normalizeConfigKey(name)]
return ok
}
func FilterSensitiveConfigs(in map[string]string) map[string]string {
if len(in) == 0 {
return map[string]string{}
}
out := make(map[string]string, len(in))
for name, value := range in {
if IsSensitiveConfigKey(name) {
continue
}
out[name] = value
}
return out
}
func normalizeConfigKey(name string) string {
return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(name))
}
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
package repo
import "testing"
func TestConfigPolicy(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
key string
want ConfigAccessPolicy
}{
{name: "app_name is public", key: "app_name", want: ConfigAccessPublic},
{name: "app_logo is public", key: "app_logo", want: ConfigAccessPublic},
{name: "app_favicon is public", key: "app_favicon", want: ConfigAccessPublic},
{name: "app_bg_image is public", key: "app_bg_image", want: ConfigAccessPublic},
{name: "cloudflare_site_key is public", key: "cloudflare_site_key", want: ConfigAccessPublic},
{name: "jwt_secret is sensitive", key: "jwt_secret", want: ConfigAccessSensitive},
{name: "license_key is sensitive", key: "license_key", want: ConfigAccessSensitive},
{name: "cloudflare_secret_key is sensitive", key: "cloudflare_secret_key", want: ConfigAccessSensitive},
{name: "trimmed public key is public", key: " APP_NAME ", want: ConfigAccessPublic},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := PolicyForConfig(tt.key); got != tt.want {
t.Fatalf("PolicyForConfig(%q) = %v, want %v", tt.key, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestConfigPolicyHelpers(t *testing.T) {
publicKeys := []string{"app_name", "app_logo", "app_favicon", "app_bg_image", "cloudflare_site_key"}
for _, key := range publicKeys {
if !IsPublicConfigKey(key) {
t.Fatalf("expected %q to be public", key)
}
}
sensitiveKeys := []string{"jwt_secret", "license_key", "cloudflare_secret_key"}
for _, key := range sensitiveKeys {
if !IsSensitiveConfigKey(key) {
t.Fatalf("expected %q to be sensitive", key)
}
}
input := map[string]string{
"app_name": "FLVX",
"license_key": "secret-license",
"cloudflare_secret_key": "secret-cloudflare",
"jwt_secret": "secret-jwt",
"cloudflare_site_key": "site-key",
}
filtered := FilterSensitiveConfigs(input)
if len(filtered) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 public configs, got %d", len(filtered))
}
if filtered["app_name"] != "FLVX" || filtered["cloudflare_site_key"] != "site-key" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected filtered configs: %+v", filtered)
}
if _, ok := filtered["jwt_secret"]; ok {
t.Fatal("expected jwt_secret to be filtered out")
}
if _, ok := filtered["license_key"]; ok {
t.Fatal("expected license_key to be filtered out")
}
if _, ok := filtered["cloudflare_secret_key"]; ok {
t.Fatal("expected cloudflare_secret_key to be filtered out")
}
}
+74 -27
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
package repo
import (
"crypto/rand"
"database/sql"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log"
@@ -19,6 +21,7 @@ import (
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"gorm.io/gorm/logger"
"go-backend/internal/security"
"go-backend/internal/store/model"
)
@@ -416,13 +419,23 @@ func prepareSQLiteLegacyColumns(db *gorm.DB) error {
}
func seedData(db *gorm.DB) {
adminUser := model.User{
ID: 1, User: "admin_user", Pwd: "3c85cdebade1c51cf64ca9f3c09d182d",
RoleID: 0, ExpTime: 2727251700000, Flow: 99999, InFlow: 0, OutFlow: 0,
FlowResetTime: 1, Num: 99999, CreatedTime: 1748914865000,
UpdatedTime: sql.NullInt64{Int64: 1754011744252, Valid: true}, Status: 1,
var adminCount int64
if err := db.Model(&model.User{}).Where("id = ?", 1).Count(&adminCount).Error; err == nil && adminCount == 0 {
adminPwd, err := security.HashPassword("admin_user")
if err != nil {
log.Printf("seed admin password hash failed: %v", err)
} else {
adminUser := model.User{
ID: 1, User: "admin_user", Pwd: adminPwd,
RoleID: 0, ExpTime: 2727251700000, Flow: 99999, InFlow: 0, OutFlow: 0,
FlowResetTime: 1, Num: 99999, CreatedTime: 1748914865000,
UpdatedTime: sql.NullInt64{Int64: 1754011744252, Valid: true},
Status: 1,
PasswordChangedAt: 1748914865000,
}
db.Create(&adminUser)
}
}
db.Where("id = ?", 1).FirstOrCreate(&adminUser)
appNameConfig := model.ViteConfig{ID: 1, Name: "app_name", Value: "flux", Time: 1755147963000}
db.Where("id = ?", 1).FirstOrCreate(&appNameConfig)
@@ -486,9 +499,10 @@ func (r *Repository) UpdateUserNameAndPassword(userID int64, username, passwordM
return errors.New("repository not initialized")
}
return r.db.Model(&model.User{}).Where("id = ?", userID).Updates(map[string]interface{}{
"user": username,
"pwd": passwordMD5,
"updated_time": now,
"user": username,
"pwd": passwordMD5,
"password_changed_at": now,
"updated_time": now,
}).Error
}
@@ -1890,7 +1904,7 @@ func (r *Repository) ExportAll() (*model.BackupData, error) {
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("export configs failed: %w", err)
}
backup.Configs = configs
backup.Configs = FilterSensitiveConfigs(configs)
return backup, nil
}
@@ -1970,7 +1984,7 @@ func (r *Repository) ExportPartial(types []string) (*model.BackupData, error) {
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("export configs failed: %w", err)
}
backup.Configs = v
backup.Configs = FilterSensitiveConfigs(v)
}
return backup, nil
}
@@ -2352,26 +2366,31 @@ func (r *Repository) Import(backup *model.BackupData, types []string) (*model.Im
func importUsers(tx *gorm.DB, users []model.UserBackup, now int64) (int, error) {
count := 0
for _, u := range users {
item := model.User{
ID: u.ID,
User: u.User,
Pwd: u.Pwd,
RoleID: u.RoleID,
ExpTime: u.ExpTime,
Flow: u.Flow,
InFlow: u.InFlow,
OutFlow: u.OutFlow,
FlowResetTime: u.FlowResetTime,
Num: u.Num,
CreatedTime: u.CreatedTime,
UpdatedTime: sql.NullInt64{Int64: now, Valid: true},
Status: u.Status,
pwdHash, status, err := normalizeImportedUserPassword(u.Pwd, u.Status)
if err != nil {
return count, err
}
err := tx.Clauses(clause.OnConflict{
item := model.User{
ID: u.ID,
User: u.User,
Pwd: pwdHash,
RoleID: u.RoleID,
ExpTime: u.ExpTime,
Flow: u.Flow,
InFlow: u.InFlow,
OutFlow: u.OutFlow,
FlowResetTime: u.FlowResetTime,
Num: u.Num,
CreatedTime: u.CreatedTime,
UpdatedTime: sql.NullInt64{Int64: now, Valid: true},
Status: status,
PasswordChangedAt: now,
}
err = tx.Clauses(clause.OnConflict{
Columns: []clause.Column{{Name: "id"}},
DoUpdates: clause.AssignmentColumns([]string{
"user", "pwd", "role_id", "exp_time", "flow", "in_flow", "out_flow",
"flow_reset_time", "num", "updated_time", "status",
"flow_reset_time", "num", "updated_time", "status", "password_changed_at",
}),
}).Create(&item).Error
if err != nil {
@@ -2415,6 +2434,33 @@ func importUsers(tx *gorm.DB, users []model.UserBackup, now int64) (int, error)
return count, nil
}
func normalizeImportedUserPassword(password string, status int) (string, int, error) {
password = strings.TrimSpace(password)
if strings.HasPrefix(password, "$2") {
return password, status, nil
}
if security.IsLegacyPasswordHash(password) || password == "" {
replacement, err := randomPasswordHash()
if err != nil {
return "", status, err
}
return replacement, 0, nil
}
hash, err := security.HashPassword(password)
if err != nil {
return "", status, err
}
return hash, status, nil
}
func randomPasswordHash() (string, error) {
buf := make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return security.HashPassword(hex.EncodeToString(buf))
}
func importNodes(tx *gorm.DB, nodes []model.NodeBackup, now int64) (int, error) {
count := 0
for _, n := range nodes {
@@ -2726,6 +2772,7 @@ func importPermissions(tx *gorm.DB, permissions []model.PermissionBackup, _ int6
}
func importConfigs(tx *gorm.DB, configs map[string]string, now int64) (int, error) {
configs = FilterSensitiveConfigs(configs)
count := 0
for name, value := range configs {
err := tx.Clauses(clause.OnConflict{
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
package repo
import (
"errors"
"go-backend/internal/auth"
"go-backend/internal/store/model"
)
func (r *Repository) GetUserAuthState(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error) {
if r == nil || r.db == nil {
return nil, errors.New("repository not initialized")
}
var user struct {
ID int64 `gorm:"column:id"`
RoleID int `gorm:"column:role_id"`
Status int `gorm:"column:status"`
PasswordChangedAt int64 `gorm:"column:password_changed_at"`
}
if err := r.db.Model(&model.User{}).Select("id", "role_id", "status", "password_changed_at").Where("id = ?", userID).First(&user).Error; err != nil {
return nil, normalizeNotFoundErr(err)
}
return &auth.UserAuthState{
ID: user.ID,
RoleID: user.RoleID,
Status: user.Status,
PasswordChangedAt: user.PasswordChangedAt,
}, nil
}
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
package repo
import (
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestGetUserAuthStateReturnsPasswordChangedAt(t *testing.T) {
r, err := Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "auth.db"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Open() error = %v", err)
}
defer r.Close()
now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
userID, err := r.CreateUser("admin_user", "pwd", 0, 2727251700000, 99999, 1, 99999, 1, 0, now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateUser() error = %v", err)
}
state, err := r.GetUserAuthState(userID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetUserAuthState() error = %v", err)
}
if state == nil || state.PasswordChangedAt != now || state.Status != 1 || state.RoleID != 0 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected auth state: %+v", state)
}
}
@@ -4,8 +4,33 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"go-backend/internal/security"
"go-backend/internal/store/model"
)
func TestSeedDataDefaultAdminUsesBcrypt(t *testing.T) {
r, err := Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "seed.db"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open repo: %v", err)
}
defer r.Close()
admin, err := r.GetUserByUsername("admin_user")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get admin user: %v", err)
}
if admin == nil {
t.Fatal("expected seeded admin user")
}
if security.IsLegacyPasswordHash(admin.Pwd) {
t.Fatalf("seeded admin password is legacy MD5: %q", admin.Pwd)
}
if ok, legacy := security.VerifyPassword(admin.Pwd, "admin_user"); !ok || legacy {
t.Fatalf("VerifyPassword() = (%v,%v), want (true,false)", ok, legacy)
}
}
func TestBackupRoundTripsTunnelProbeTarget(t *testing.T) {
source, err := Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "source.db"))
if err != nil {
@@ -57,3 +82,157 @@ func TestBackupRoundTripsTunnelProbeTarget(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("unexpected imported probe target: %+v", items[0])
}
}
func TestExportAllOmitsSensitiveConfigs(t *testing.T) {
r, err := Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "export.db"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open repo: %v", err)
}
defer r.Close()
seedConfig(t, r, "app_name", "FLVX")
seedConfig(t, r, "app_logo", "logo")
seedConfig(t, r, "app_favicon", "favicon")
seedConfig(t, r, "app_bg_image", "bg")
seedConfig(t, r, "cloudflare_site_key", "site-key")
seedConfig(t, r, "jwt_secret", "jwt-secret")
seedConfig(t, r, "license_key", "license-secret")
seedConfig(t, r, "cloudflare_secret_key", "cloudflare-secret")
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
export func() (*model.BackupData, error)
}{
{name: "ExportAll", export: r.ExportAll},
{name: "ExportPartial", export: func() (*model.BackupData, error) { return r.ExportPartial([]string{"configs"}) }},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
backup, err := tc.export()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("export backup: %v", err)
}
if backup.Configs["app_name"] != "FLVX" {
t.Fatalf("expected public config in export, got %+v", backup.Configs)
}
if backup.Configs["cloudflare_site_key"] != "site-key" {
t.Fatalf("expected public config in export, got %+v", backup.Configs)
}
for _, key := range []string{"jwt_secret", "license_key", "cloudflare_secret_key"} {
if _, ok := backup.Configs[key]; ok {
t.Fatalf("expected %s to be omitted from export, got %+v", key, backup.Configs)
}
}
})
}
}
func TestImportIgnoresSensitiveConfigs(t *testing.T) {
r, err := Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "import.db"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open repo: %v", err)
}
defer r.Close()
seedConfig(t, r, "app_name", "before")
seedConfig(t, r, "jwt_secret", "jwt-before")
seedConfig(t, r, "license_key", "license-before")
seedConfig(t, r, "cloudflare_secret_key", "cloudflare-before")
backup := &model.BackupData{Configs: map[string]string{
"app_name": "after",
"jwt_secret": "jwt-after",
"license_key": "license-after",
"cloudflare_secret_key": "cloudflare-after",
}}
result, err := r.Import(backup, []string{"configs"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("import backup: %v", err)
}
if result.ConfigsImported != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected one imported config, got %d", result.ConfigsImported)
}
assertConfigValue(t, r, "app_name", "after")
assertConfigValue(t, r, "jwt_secret", "jwt-before")
assertConfigValue(t, r, "license_key", "license-before")
assertConfigValue(t, r, "cloudflare_secret_key", "cloudflare-before")
}
func TestImportUsersDoesNotStoreLegacyMD5Passwords(t *testing.T) {
r, err := Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "legacy-user-import.db"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open repo: %v", err)
}
defer r.Close()
now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
backup := &model.BackupData{
Version: "1.0",
Users: []model.UserBackup{{
ID: 55,
User: "legacy-import-user",
Pwd: "3c85cdebade1c51cf64ca9f3c09d182d",
RoleID: 1,
ExpTime: 2727251700000,
Flow: 99999,
InFlow: 0,
OutFlow: 0,
FlowResetTime: 1,
Num: 99999,
CreatedTime: now,
UpdatedTime: now,
Status: 1,
}},
}
result, err := r.Import(backup, []string{"users"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Import() error = %v", err)
}
if result.UsersImported != 1 {
t.Fatalf("UsersImported = %d, want 1", result.UsersImported)
}
user, err := r.GetUserByUsername("legacy-import-user")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get imported user: %v", err)
}
if user == nil {
t.Fatal("expected imported user")
}
if security.IsLegacyPasswordHash(user.Pwd) {
t.Fatalf("imported password remained legacy MD5: %q", user.Pwd)
}
if ok, _ := security.VerifyPassword(user.Pwd, "admin_user"); ok {
t.Fatal("legacy imported password should not remain usable")
}
if user.Status != 0 {
t.Fatalf("legacy imported user status = %d, want disabled status 0", user.Status)
}
if user.PasswordChangedAt <= 0 {
t.Fatalf("PasswordChangedAt = %d, want import revocation timestamp", user.PasswordChangedAt)
}
}
func seedConfig(t *testing.T, r *Repository, name, value string) {
t.Helper()
if err := r.DB().Exec(`
INSERT INTO vite_config(name, value, time)
VALUES(?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT(name) DO UPDATE SET value = excluded.value, time = excluded.time
`, name, value, time.Now().UnixMilli()).Error; err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed config %s: %v", name, err)
}
}
func assertConfigValue(t *testing.T, r *Repository, name, want string) {
t.Helper()
cfg, err := r.GetConfigByName(name)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get config %s: %v", name, err)
}
if cfg == nil || cfg.Value != want {
t.Fatalf("expected config %s=%q, got %+v", name, want, cfg)
}
}
@@ -42,19 +42,20 @@ func (r *Repository) CreateUser(username, pwdHash string, roleID int, expTime, f
return 0, errors.New("repository not initialized")
}
user := model.User{
User: username,
Pwd: pwdHash,
RoleID: roleID,
ExpTime: expTime,
Flow: flow,
InFlow: 0,
OutFlow: 0,
FlowResetTime: flowResetTime,
Num: num,
MaxConn: maxConn,
CreatedTime: now,
UpdatedTime: sql.NullInt64{Int64: now, Valid: true},
Status: status,
User: username,
Pwd: pwdHash,
RoleID: roleID,
ExpTime: expTime,
Flow: flow,
InFlow: 0,
OutFlow: 0,
FlowResetTime: flowResetTime,
Num: num,
MaxConn: maxConn,
CreatedTime: now,
UpdatedTime: sql.NullInt64{Int64: now, Valid: true},
Status: status,
PasswordChangedAt: now,
}
if err := r.db.Create(&user).Error; err != nil {
return 0, err
@@ -81,15 +82,16 @@ func (r *Repository) UpdateUserWithPassword(id int64, username, pwdHash string,
return r.db.Model(&model.User{}).
Where("id = ?", id).
Updates(map[string]interface{}{
"user": username,
"pwd": pwdHash,
"flow": flow,
"num": num,
"exp_time": expTime,
"flow_reset_time": flowResetTime,
"status": status,
"max_conn": maxConn,
"updated_time": sql.NullInt64{Int64: now, Valid: true},
"user": username,
"pwd": pwdHash,
"flow": flow,
"num": num,
"exp_time": expTime,
"flow_reset_time": flowResetTime,
"status": status,
"max_conn": maxConn,
"password_changed_at": now,
"updated_time": sql.NullInt64{Int64: now, Valid: true},
}).Error
}
@@ -111,6 +113,19 @@ func (r *Repository) UpdateUserWithoutPassword(id int64, username string, flow i
}).Error
}
func (r *Repository) UpdateUserPassword(userID int64, pwdHash string, now int64) error {
if r == nil || r.db == nil {
return errors.New("repository not initialized")
}
return r.db.Model(&model.User{}).
Where("id = ?", userID).
Updates(map[string]interface{}{
"pwd": pwdHash,
"password_changed_at": now,
"updated_time": sql.NullInt64{Int64: now, Valid: true},
}).Error
}
func (r *Repository) PropagateUserFlowToTunnels(userID int64, flow int64, num int, expTime, flowResetTime int64) {
if r == nil || r.db == nil {
return
+73 -16
View File
@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@ type nodeSession struct {
crypto *security.AESCrypto // 缓存的 AES 加密器,避免每条消息重建
}
type adminSession struct {
userID int64
claims auth.Claims
conn *connWrap
}
type commandResponse struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Success bool `json:"success"`
@@ -74,9 +80,10 @@ type Server struct {
upgrader websocket.Upgrader
onNodeOnline func(nodeID int64)
onNodeMetric func(nodeID int64, info SystemInfo)
getUserAuthState func(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error)
mu sync.RWMutex
admins map[*connWrap]struct{}
admins map[*adminSession]struct{}
nodes map[int64]*nodeSession
byConn map[*websocket.Conn]*nodeSession
pending map[string]pendingRequest
@@ -123,13 +130,22 @@ func NewServer(repo *repo.Repository, jwtSecret string) *Server {
upgrader: websocket.Upgrader{
CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool { return true },
},
admins: make(map[*connWrap]struct{}),
admins: make(map[*adminSession]struct{}),
nodes: make(map[int64]*nodeSession),
byConn: make(map[*websocket.Conn]*nodeSession),
pending: make(map[string]pendingRequest),
}
}
func (s *Server) SetUserAuthStateLookup(fn func(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error)) {
if s == nil {
return
}
s.mu.Lock()
s.getUserAuthState = fn
s.mu.Unlock()
}
func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
query := r.URL.Query()
typeVal := query.Get("type")
@@ -146,18 +162,32 @@ func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
if typeVal == "0" {
if _, ok := auth.ValidateToken(secret, s.jwtSecret); !ok {
claims, ok := auth.ValidateToken(secret, s.jwtSecret)
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
s.handleAdmin(w, r)
userID, err := strconv.ParseInt(claims.Sub, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
if claims.RoleID != 0 {
http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
if !s.validateAdminSession(userID, claims) {
http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
s.handleAdmin(w, r, userID, claims)
return
}
http.Error(w, "bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
}
func (s *Server) handleAdmin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
func (s *Server) handleAdmin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, userID int64, claims auth.Claims) {
conn, err := s.upgrader.Upgrade(w, r, nil)
if err != nil {
return
@@ -168,16 +198,19 @@ func (s *Server) handleAdmin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(wsPongWait))
})
done := make(chan struct{})
go startKeepalive(cw, done)
session := &adminSession{userID: userID, claims: claims, conn: cw}
go startKeepalive(cw, done, func() bool {
return s.validateAdminSession(session.userID, session.claims)
})
s.mu.Lock()
s.admins[cw] = struct{}{}
s.admins[session] = struct{}{}
s.mu.Unlock()
defer func() {
close(done)
s.mu.Lock()
delete(s.admins, cw)
delete(s.admins, session)
s.mu.Unlock()
_ = conn.Close()
}()
@@ -200,7 +233,7 @@ func (s *Server) handleNode(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, nodeID int64
return conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(wsPongWait))
})
done := make(chan struct{})
go startKeepalive(cw, done)
go startKeepalive(cw, done, nil)
version := r.URL.Query().Get("version")
httpVal := parseIntDefault(r.URL.Query().Get("http"), 0)
@@ -554,18 +587,21 @@ func (s *Server) broadcastTyped(nodeID int64, msgType string, data string) {
func (s *Server) broadcastToAdmins(message string) {
s.mu.RLock()
admins := make([]*connWrap, 0, len(s.admins))
admins := make([]*adminSession, 0, len(s.admins))
for c := range s.admins {
admins = append(admins, c)
}
s.mu.RUnlock()
for _, c := range admins {
c.mu.Lock()
_ = c.conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(wsWriteWait))
err := c.conn.WriteMessage(websocket.TextMessage, []byte(message))
_ = c.conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Time{})
c.mu.Unlock()
if c == nil || c.conn == nil || c.conn.conn == nil {
continue
}
c.conn.mu.Lock()
_ = c.conn.conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(wsWriteWait))
err := c.conn.conn.WriteMessage(websocket.TextMessage, []byte(message))
_ = c.conn.conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Time{})
c.conn.mu.Unlock()
if err != nil {
log.Printf("websocket broadcast failed: %v", err)
}
@@ -602,7 +638,24 @@ func parseIntDefault(v string, fallback int) int {
return x
}
func startKeepalive(cw *connWrap, done <-chan struct{}) {
func (s *Server) validateAdminSession(userID int64, claims auth.Claims) bool {
if s == nil {
return false
}
if claims.Exp <= time.Now().Unix() {
return false
}
if s.getUserAuthState == nil {
return true
}
state, err := s.getUserAuthState(userID)
if err != nil || state == nil || state.Status != 1 || state.RoleID != claims.RoleID || claims.IatMs <= state.PasswordChangedAt {
return false
}
return true
}
func startKeepalive(cw *connWrap, done <-chan struct{}, validate func() bool) {
if cw == nil || cw.conn == nil {
return
}
@@ -614,6 +667,10 @@ func startKeepalive(cw *connWrap, done <-chan struct{}) {
case <-done:
return
case <-ticker.C:
if validate != nil && !validate() {
_ = cw.conn.Close()
return
}
cw.mu.Lock()
_ = cw.conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(wsWriteWait))
err := cw.conn.WriteMessage(websocket.PingMessage, nil)
+110
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
package ws
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"testing"
"go-backend/internal/auth"
)
func TestServeHTTPRejectsDisabledAdminToken(t *testing.T) {
secret := "unit-test-secret"
token, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
server := NewServer(nil, secret)
server.SetUserAuthStateLookup(func(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error) {
return &auth.UserAuthState{ID: userID, RoleID: 0, Status: 0, PasswordChangedAt: 0}, nil
})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/system-info?type=0&secret="+url.QueryEscape(token), nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
server.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("expected forbidden for disabled admin token, got %d", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestServeHTTPRejectsNonAdminToken(t *testing.T) {
secret := "unit-test-secret"
token, err := auth.GenerateToken(2, "normal_user", 1, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
server := NewServer(nil, secret)
server.SetUserAuthStateLookup(func(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error) {
return &auth.UserAuthState{ID: userID, RoleID: 1, Status: 1, PasswordChangedAt: 0}, nil
})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/system-info?type=0&secret="+url.QueryEscape(token), nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
server.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("expected forbidden for non-admin token, got %d", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestValidateAdminSessionRejectsAuthStateChanges(t *testing.T) {
secret := "unit-test-secret"
token, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
claims, err := auth.ParseClaims(token, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse claims: %v", err)
}
tests := []struct {
name string
state *auth.UserAuthState
}{
{name: "disabled", state: &auth.UserAuthState{ID: 1, RoleID: 0, Status: 0, PasswordChangedAt: 0}},
{name: "role changed", state: &auth.UserAuthState{ID: 1, RoleID: 1, Status: 1, PasswordChangedAt: 0}},
{name: "password changed", state: &auth.UserAuthState{ID: 1, RoleID: 0, Status: 1, PasswordChangedAt: claims.IatMs + 1}},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
server := NewServer(nil, secret)
server.SetUserAuthStateLookup(func(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error) {
return tt.state, nil
})
if ok := server.validateAdminSession(1, claims); ok {
t.Fatalf("expected session validation to fail for %s state", tt.name)
}
})
}
}
func TestValidateAdminSessionRejectsExpiredToken(t *testing.T) {
secret := "unit-test-secret"
token, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
claims, err := auth.ParseClaims(token, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse claims: %v", err)
}
claims.Exp = 1
server := NewServer(nil, secret)
server.SetUserAuthStateLookup(func(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error) {
return &auth.UserAuthState{ID: userID, RoleID: 0, Status: 1, PasswordChangedAt: 0}, nil
})
if ok := server.validateAdminSession(1, claims); ok {
t.Fatal("expected expired token to be rejected")
}
}
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package contract_test
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
@@ -9,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"go-backend/internal/auth"
"go-backend/internal/http/middleware"
"go-backend/internal/http/response"
"go-backend/internal/security"
)
func TestJWTMiddlewareContracts(t *testing.T) {
@@ -18,7 +20,9 @@ func TestJWTMiddlewareContracts(t *testing.T) {
response.WriteJSON(w, response.OK("pass"))
})
wrapped := middleware.JWT(middleware.AuthOptions{JWTSecret: secret})(next)
wrapped := middleware.JWT(middleware.AuthOptions{JWTSecret: secret, GetUserAuthState: func(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error) {
return &auth.UserAuthState{ID: userID, RoleID: 0, Status: 1, PasswordChangedAt: 0}, nil
}})(next)
t.Run("login path is excluded", func(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/user/login", nil)
@@ -59,6 +63,9 @@ func TestJWTMiddlewareContracts(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
wrapped := middleware.JWT(middleware.AuthOptions{JWTSecret: secret, GetUserAuthState: func(userID int64) (*auth.UserAuthState, error) {
return &auth.UserAuthState{ID: userID, RoleID: 1, Status: 1, PasswordChangedAt: 0}, nil
}})(next)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/config/update", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", token)
res := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -67,6 +74,83 @@ func TestJWTMiddlewareContracts(t *testing.T) {
})
}
func TestLoginTokenValidatesThroughRouter(t *testing.T) {
router, r := setupContractRouter(t, "contract-jwt-secret")
seedLegacyUser(t, r, 9110, "router-login-user", "router-login-pass")
body := bytes.NewBufferString(`{"username":"router-login-user","password":"router-login-pass","captchaId":""}`)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/user/login", body)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
var out response.R
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&out); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode login response: %v", err)
}
if out.Code != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected login code 0, got %d (%s)", out.Code, out.Msg)
}
data, ok := out.Data.(map[string]interface{})
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("expected login data map, got %T", out.Data)
}
token, _ := data["token"].(string)
if token == "" {
t.Fatal("expected login token")
}
checkReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/tunnel/user/tunnel", nil)
checkReq.Header.Set("Authorization", token)
checkResp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(checkResp, checkReq)
assertCode(t, checkResp, 0)
}
func TestLegacyPasswordMigratesOnLogin(t *testing.T) {
router, r := setupContractRouter(t, "contract-jwt-secret")
legacyChangedAt := seedLegacyUser(t, r, 9101, "legacy-login-user", "legacy-login-pass")
body := bytes.NewBufferString(`{"username":"legacy-login-user","password":"legacy-login-pass","captchaId":""}`)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/user/login", body)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
assertCode(t, resp, 0)
assertUserPasswordIsBcrypt(t, r, "legacy-login-user", "legacy-login-pass")
if changedAt := mustQueryPasswordChangedAtByUsername(t, r, "legacy-login-user"); changedAt <= legacyChangedAt {
t.Fatalf("expected password_changed_at to advance on login migration, got %d <= %d", changedAt, legacyChangedAt)
}
}
func TestDisabledLegacyPasswordIsRejectedWithoutMigration(t *testing.T) {
router, r := setupContractRouter(t, "contract-jwt-secret")
legacyChangedAt := seedLegacyUserWithStatus(t, r, 9105, "disabled-legacy-user", "disabled-legacy-pass", 0)
body := bytes.NewBufferString(`{"username":"disabled-legacy-user","password":"disabled-legacy-pass","captchaId":""}`)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/user/login", body)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
assertCodeMsg(t, resp, -1, "账号被停用")
user, err := r.GetUserByUsername("disabled-legacy-user")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get user: %v", err)
}
if user == nil {
t.Fatal("expected disabled user to exist")
}
if ok, migrated := security.VerifyPassword(user.Pwd, "disabled-legacy-pass"); !ok || !migrated {
t.Fatalf("expected disabled user to remain legacy MD5, got (%v,%v) with hash %q", ok, migrated, user.Pwd)
}
if changedAt := mustQueryPasswordChangedAtByUsername(t, r, "disabled-legacy-user"); changedAt != legacyChangedAt {
t.Fatalf("expected password_changed_at to remain unchanged, got %d want %d", changedAt, legacyChangedAt)
}
}
func assertCode(t *testing.T, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder, expected int) {
t.Helper()
var out response.R
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
httpserver "go-backend/internal/http"
"go-backend/internal/http/handler"
"go-backend/internal/http/response"
"go-backend/internal/security"
"go-backend/internal/store/repo"
"gorm.io/gorm"
@@ -128,6 +129,46 @@ func TestCaptchaVerifyLoginContract(t *testing.T) {
})
}
func TestPublicConfigGetAndAuthConfigContract(t *testing.T) {
router, r := setupContractRouter(t, "contract-jwt-secret")
for name, value := range map[string]string{
"app_name": "FLVX Public",
"app_logo": "logo",
"app_favicon": "favicon",
"app_bg_image": "bg",
"cloudflare_site_key": "site-key",
"cloudflare_secret_key": "secret-key",
"jwt_secret": "jwt-secret",
} {
if err := r.DB().Exec(`
INSERT INTO vite_config(name, value, time)
VALUES(?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT(name) DO UPDATE SET value = excluded.value, time = excluded.time
`, name, value, time.Now().UnixMilli()).Error; err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed config %s: %v", name, err)
}
}
publicReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/public/config/get", bytes.NewBufferString(`{"name":"app_name"}`))
publicReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
publicResp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(publicResp, publicReq)
assertCode(t, publicResp, 0)
secretReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/public/config/get", bytes.NewBufferString(`{"name":"jwt_secret"}`))
secretReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
secretResp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(secretResp, secretReq)
assertCodeMsg(t, secretResp, 403, "禁止访问敏感配置")
configReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/config/get", bytes.NewBufferString(`{"name":"app_name"}`))
configReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
configResp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(configResp, configReq)
assertCodeMsg(t, configResp, 401, "未登录或token已过期")
}
func TestOpenAPISubStoreContracts(t *testing.T) {
router, r := setupContractRouter(t, "contract-jwt-secret")
@@ -209,6 +250,122 @@ func TestOpenAPISubStoreContracts(t *testing.T) {
})
}
func TestLegacyPasswordMigratesOnSubStore(t *testing.T) {
router, r := setupContractRouter(t, "contract-jwt-secret")
legacyChangedAt := seedLegacyUser(t, r, 9102, "legacy-substore-user", "legacy-substore-pass")
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/open_api/sub_store?user=legacy-substore-user&pwd=legacy-substore-pass", nil)
resp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read body: %v", err)
}
expected := "upload=0; download=0; total=107373108658176; expire=2727251700"
if string(body) != expected {
t.Fatalf("expected body %q, got %q", expected, string(body))
}
assertUserPasswordIsBcrypt(t, r, "legacy-substore-user", "legacy-substore-pass")
if changedAt := mustQueryPasswordChangedAtByUsername(t, r, "legacy-substore-user"); changedAt <= legacyChangedAt {
t.Fatalf("expected password_changed_at to advance on sub-store migration, got %d <= %d", changedAt, legacyChangedAt)
}
}
func TestDisabledLegacyPasswordIsRejectedOnSubStoreWithoutMigration(t *testing.T) {
router, r := setupContractRouter(t, "contract-jwt-secret")
legacyChangedAt := seedLegacyUserWithStatus(t, r, 9106, "disabled-substore-user", "disabled-substore-pass", 0)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/open_api/sub_store?user=disabled-substore-user&pwd=disabled-substore-pass", nil)
resp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
assertCodeMsg(t, resp, -1, "账号被停用")
user, err := r.GetUserByUsername("disabled-substore-user")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get user: %v", err)
}
if user == nil {
t.Fatal("expected disabled user to exist")
}
if ok, migrated := security.VerifyPassword(user.Pwd, "disabled-substore-pass"); !ok || !migrated {
t.Fatalf("expected disabled user to remain legacy MD5, got (%v,%v) with hash %q", ok, migrated, user.Pwd)
}
if changedAt := mustQueryPasswordChangedAtByUsername(t, r, "disabled-substore-user"); changedAt != legacyChangedAt {
t.Fatalf("expected password_changed_at to remain unchanged, got %d want %d", changedAt, legacyChangedAt)
}
}
func TestUserCreateStoresStrongHash(t *testing.T) {
router, r := setupContractRouter(t, "contract-jwt-secret")
startedAt := time.Now().UnixMilli()
adminToken, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, "contract-jwt-secret")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
body := bytes.NewBufferString(`{"user":"created-user","pwd":"created-pass"}`)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/user/create", body)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", adminToken)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
assertCode(t, resp, 0)
assertUserPasswordIsBcrypt(t, r, "created-user", "created-pass")
if changedAt := mustQueryPasswordChangedAtByUsername(t, r, "created-user"); changedAt < startedAt {
t.Fatalf("expected password_changed_at to be set on create, got %d < %d", changedAt, startedAt)
}
}
func TestUserUpdateStoresStrongHash(t *testing.T) {
router, r := setupContractRouter(t, "contract-jwt-secret")
seedLegacyUser(t, r, 9103, "legacy-update-user", "legacy-update-pass")
startedAt := time.Now().UnixMilli()
adminToken, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, "contract-jwt-secret")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
body := bytes.NewBufferString(`{"id":9103,"user":"updated-user","pwd":"updated-pass","flow":99999,"num":99999,"expTime":2727251700000,"flowResetTime":1,"status":1,"maxConn":0}`)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/user/update", body)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", adminToken)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
assertCode(t, resp, 0)
assertUserPasswordIsBcrypt(t, r, "updated-user", "updated-pass")
if changedAt := mustQueryPasswordChangedAtByUsername(t, r, "updated-user"); changedAt < startedAt {
t.Fatalf("expected password_changed_at to be updated on user update, got %d < %d", changedAt, startedAt)
}
}
func TestUpdatePasswordStoresStrongHash(t *testing.T) {
router, r := setupContractRouter(t, "contract-jwt-secret")
seedLegacyUser(t, r, 9104, "legacy-self-user", "legacy-self-pass")
startedAt := time.Now().UnixMilli()
token, err := auth.GenerateToken(9104, "legacy-self-user", 1, "contract-jwt-secret")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate token: %v", err)
}
body := bytes.NewBufferString(`{"newUsername":"self-updated-user","currentPassword":"legacy-self-pass","newPassword":"self-updated-pass","confirmPassword":"self-updated-pass"}`)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/user/updatePassword", body)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", token)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
assertCode(t, resp, 0)
assertUserPasswordIsBcrypt(t, r, "self-updated-user", "self-updated-pass")
if changedAt := mustQueryPasswordChangedAtByUsername(t, r, "self-updated-user"); changedAt < startedAt {
t.Fatalf("expected password_changed_at to be updated on password change, got %d < %d", changedAt, startedAt)
}
}
func TestSpeedLimitTunnelsRouteRemoved(t *testing.T) {
secret := "contract-jwt-secret"
router, _ := setupContractRouter(t, secret)
@@ -232,6 +389,7 @@ func TestSpeedLimitTunnelsRouteRemoved(t *testing.T) {
func TestBackupExportImportRestoreContracts(t *testing.T) {
secret := "contract-jwt-secret"
router, r := setupContractRouter(t, secret)
seedContractUser(t, r, 2, "normal_user", 1, 1)
adminToken, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, secret)
if err != nil {
@@ -559,6 +717,71 @@ func TestBackupExportImportRestoreContracts(t *testing.T) {
})
}
func TestBackupConfigFilteringContract(t *testing.T) {
secret := "contract-jwt-secret"
router, r := setupContractRouter(t, secret)
adminToken, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, secret)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate admin token: %v", err)
}
configs := map[string]string{
"app_name": "contract-before",
"cloudflare_site_key": "site-key-before",
"jwt_secret": "jwt-before",
"license_key": "license-before",
"cloudflare_secret_key": "cloudflare-before",
}
for name, value := range configs {
if err := r.DB().Exec(`
INSERT INTO vite_config(name, value, time)
VALUES(?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT(name) DO UPDATE SET value = excluded.value, time = excluded.time
`, name, value, time.Now().UnixMilli()).Error; err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed config %s: %v", name, err)
}
}
payload := exportBackupPayload(t, router, "/api/v1/backup/export", adminToken)
for _, key := range []string{"jwt_secret", "license_key", "cloudflare_secret_key"} {
if _, ok := payload.Configs[key]; ok {
t.Fatalf("expected %s to be omitted from exported configs: %+v", key, payload.Configs)
}
}
if payload.Configs["app_name"] != "contract-before" {
t.Fatalf("expected public config to be exported, got %+v", payload.Configs)
}
payload.Configs["app_name"] = "contract-after"
payload.Configs["jwt_secret"] = "jwt-after"
payload.Configs["license_key"] = "license-after"
payload.Configs["cloudflare_secret_key"] = "cloudflare-after"
raw, err := json.Marshal(backupImportPayload{Types: []string{"configs"}, backupExportPayload: payload})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal import payload: %v", err)
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/backup/import", bytes.NewReader(raw))
req.Header.Set("Authorization", adminToken)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
var out response.R
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&out); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode import response: %v", err)
}
if out.Code != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected import code 0, got %d (%s)", out.Code, out.Msg)
}
assertConfigValue(t, r, "app_name", "contract-after")
assertConfigValue(t, r, "jwt_secret", "jwt-before")
assertConfigValue(t, r, "license_key", "license-before")
assertConfigValue(t, r, "cloudflare_secret_key", "cloudflare-before")
}
type backupExportPayload struct {
Version string `json:"version"`
ExportedAt int64 `json:"exportedAt"`
@@ -619,6 +842,66 @@ func setupContractRouter(t *testing.T, jwtSecret string) (http.Handler, *repo.Re
return httpserver.NewRouter(h, jwtSecret), r
}
func assertConfigValue(t *testing.T, r *repo.Repository, name, want string) {
t.Helper()
cfg, err := r.GetConfigByName(name)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get config %s: %v", name, err)
}
if cfg == nil || cfg.Value != want {
t.Fatalf("expected config %s=%q, got %+v", name, want, cfg)
}
}
func seedLegacyUser(t *testing.T, r *repo.Repository, id int64, username, password string) int64 {
return seedLegacyUserWithStatus(t, r, id, username, password, 1)
}
func seedContractUser(t *testing.T, r *repo.Repository, id int64, username string, roleID, status int) int64 {
t.Helper()
now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
passwordChangedAt := now - 10_000
if err := r.DB().Exec(`
INSERT INTO user(id, user, pwd, role_id, exp_time, flow, in_flow, out_flow, flow_reset_time, num, max_conn, created_time, updated_time, status, password_changed_at)
VALUES(?, ?, ?, ?, 2727251700000, 99999, 0, 0, 1, 99999, 0, ?, ?, ?, ?)
`, id, username, security.MD5("contract-pass"), roleID, now, now, status, passwordChangedAt).Error; err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed contract user %s: %v", username, err)
}
return passwordChangedAt
}
func seedLegacyUserWithStatus(t *testing.T, r *repo.Repository, id int64, username, password string, status int) int64 {
t.Helper()
now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
legacyChangedAt := now - 10_000
if err := r.DB().Exec(`
INSERT INTO user(id, user, pwd, role_id, exp_time, flow, in_flow, out_flow, flow_reset_time, num, max_conn, created_time, updated_time, status, password_changed_at)
VALUES(?, ?, ?, 1, 2727251700000, 99999, 0, 0, 1, 99999, 0, ?, ?, ?, ?)
`, id, username, security.MD5(password), now, now, status, legacyChangedAt).Error; err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed legacy user %s: %v", username, err)
}
return legacyChangedAt
}
func mustQueryPasswordChangedAtByUsername(t *testing.T, r *repo.Repository, username string) int64 {
t.Helper()
return mustQueryInt64(t, r, `SELECT password_changed_at FROM user WHERE user = ?`, username)
}
func assertUserPasswordIsBcrypt(t *testing.T, r *repo.Repository, username, password string) {
t.Helper()
user, err := r.GetUserByUsername(username)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get user %s: %v", username, err)
}
if user == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected user %s to exist", username)
}
if ok, migrated := security.VerifyPassword(user.Pwd, password); !ok || migrated {
t.Fatalf("expected bcrypt password for %s, got %q", username, user.Pwd)
}
}
func TestOpenMigratesLegacyNodeDualStackColumns(t *testing.T) {
dbPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "legacy-2.0.7-beta.db")
legacyDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dbPath)
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
func TestNodeMetricsEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
secret := "monitoring-jwt-secret"
router, repo := setupContractRouter(t, secret)
seedContractUser(t, repo, 2, "normal_user", 1, 1)
adminToken, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, secret)
if err != nil {
@@ -1302,6 +1303,7 @@ func TestMonitoringAuthRequired(t *testing.T) {
func TestMonitorAccessEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
secret := "monitoring-jwt-secret"
router, repo := setupContractRouter(t, secret)
seedContractUser(t, repo, 2, "normal_user", 1, 1)
adminToken, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, secret)
if err != nil {
@@ -1357,6 +1359,7 @@ func TestMonitorAccessEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
func TestMonitoringPermissionRequired(t *testing.T) {
secret := "monitoring-jwt-secret"
router, repo := setupContractRouter(t, secret)
seedContractUser(t, repo, 2, "normal_user", 1, 1)
userToken, err := auth.GenerateToken(2, "normal_user", 1, secret)
if err != nil {
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ import (
func TestStorageSummaryRequiresAdminAndReturnsSize(t *testing.T) {
secret := "storage-contract-secret"
router, _ := setupContractRouter(t, secret)
router, r := setupContractRouter(t, secret)
seedContractUser(t, r, 2, "normal_user", 1, 1)
adminToken, err := auth.GenerateToken(1, "admin_user", 0, secret)
if err != nil {
+2
View File
@@ -253,6 +253,8 @@ export const getConfigs = () =>
Network.post<Record<string, string>>("/config/list");
export const getConfigByName = (name: string) =>
Network.post<{ name: string; value: string }>("/config/get", { name });
export const getPublicConfigByName = (name: string) =>
Network.post<{ name: string; value: string }>("/public/config/get", { name });
export const updateConfigs = (configMap: Record<string, string>) =>
Network.post("/config/update", configMap);
export const updateConfig = (name: string, value: string) =>
+114 -44
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import { getConfigByName, getConfigs } from "@/api";
import { getConfigByName, getConfigs, getPublicConfigByName } from "@/api";
import { isLoggedIn } from "@/utils/auth";
export type SiteConfig = typeof siteConfig;
@@ -8,9 +9,73 @@ const VERSION = import.meta.env.VITE_APP_VERSION || "dev";
const APP_VERSION = "1.0.3";
const DEFAULT_FAVICON = "/favicon.ico";
const FAVICON_LINK_ID = "app-favicon";
const PUBLIC_BRAND_CONFIG_KEYS = [
"app_name",
"app_logo",
"app_favicon",
"app_bg_image",
] as const;
const SENSITIVE_CONFIG_KEYS = new Set([
"jwt_secret",
"license_key",
"cloudflare_secret_key",
]);
const GITHUB_REPO =
import.meta.env.VITE_GITHUB_REPO || "https://github.com/Sagit-chu/flux-panel";
const shouldPersistConfigKey = (key: string) => {
return !SENSITIVE_CONFIG_KEYS.has(key.trim().toLowerCase());
};
const purgeSensitiveConfigCache = () => {
SENSITIVE_CONFIG_KEYS.forEach((key) => {
localStorage.removeItem(CACHE_PREFIX + key);
});
};
const readCachedConfigs = (keys: readonly string[]) => {
const cachedConfigs: Record<string, string> = {};
let hasCachedData = false;
keys.forEach((key) => {
const cachedValue = configCache.get(key);
if (cachedValue !== null) {
cachedConfigs[key] = cachedValue;
hasCachedData = true;
}
});
return { cachedConfigs, hasCachedData };
};
const fetchPublicBrandConfigs = async (): Promise<Record<string, string>> => {
const publicConfigMap: Record<string, string> = {};
await Promise.all(
PUBLIC_BRAND_CONFIG_KEYS.map(async (key) => {
try {
const response = await getPublicConfigByName(key);
if (
response.code === 0 &&
response.data &&
typeof response.data.value === "string"
) {
const value = response.data.value;
publicConfigMap[key] = value;
configCache.set(key, value);
}
} catch {
// ignore single key fetch error
}
}),
);
return publicConfigMap;
};
const getInitialConfig = () => {
if (typeof window === "undefined") {
return {
@@ -26,6 +91,8 @@ const getInitialConfig = () => {
};
}
purgeSensitiveConfigCache();
const cachedAppName = localStorage.getItem(CACHE_PREFIX + "app_name");
const cachedAppLogo = localStorage.getItem(CACHE_PREFIX + "app_logo") || "";
const cachedAppFavicon =
@@ -77,7 +144,15 @@ export const configCache = {
// 设置缓存的配置
set: (key: string, value: string): void => {
const cacheKey = CACHE_PREFIX + key;
const normalizedKey = key.trim().toLowerCase();
if (!shouldPersistConfigKey(normalizedKey)) {
configCache.remove(normalizedKey);
return;
}
const cacheKey = CACHE_PREFIX + normalizedKey;
localStorage.setItem(cacheKey, value);
},
@@ -119,7 +194,9 @@ export const getCachedConfig = async (key: string): Promise<string | null> => {
) {
const value = response.data.value;
configCache.set(key, value);
if (shouldPersistConfigKey(key)) {
configCache.set(key, value);
}
return value;
}
@@ -129,46 +206,19 @@ export const getCachedConfig = async (key: string): Promise<string | null> => {
// 获取所有配置(优先从缓存)
export const getCachedConfigs = async (): Promise<Record<string, string>> => {
// 尝试从缓存获取所有配置
const configKeys = ["app_name", "app_logo", "app_favicon", "app_bg_image"];
const cachedConfigs: Record<string, string> = {};
let hasCachedData = false;
const { cachedConfigs, hasCachedData } = readCachedConfigs(
PUBLIC_BRAND_CONFIG_KEYS,
);
configKeys.forEach((key) => {
const cachedValue = configCache.get(key);
if (!isLoggedIn()) {
const publicConfigs = await fetchPublicBrandConfigs();
if (cachedValue !== null) {
cachedConfigs[key] = cachedValue;
hasCachedData = true;
if (Object.keys(publicConfigs).length > 0) {
return { ...cachedConfigs, ...publicConfigs };
}
});
const fetchPublicConfigs = async (): Promise<Record<string, string>> => {
const publicConfigMap: Record<string, string> = {};
await Promise.all(
configKeys.map(async (key) => {
try {
const response = await getConfigByName(key);
if (
response.code === 0 &&
response.data &&
typeof response.data.value === "string"
) {
const value = response.data.value;
publicConfigMap[key] = value;
configCache.set(key, value);
}
} catch {
// ignore single key fetch error
}
}),
);
return publicConfigMap;
};
return cachedConfigs;
}
// 从API获取最新配置
try {
@@ -177,9 +227,19 @@ export const getCachedConfigs = async (): Promise<Record<string, string>> => {
if (response.code === 0 && response.data) {
const configs = response.data;
// 将所有配置存入缓存
// 仅将安全配置存入缓存,敏感项会从 localStorage 中移除
Object.entries(configs).forEach(([key, value]) => {
configCache.set(key, value as string);
const normalizedKey = key.trim().toLowerCase();
if (SENSITIVE_CONFIG_KEYS.has(normalizedKey)) {
configCache.remove(normalizedKey);
return;
}
if (shouldPersistConfigKey(normalizedKey)) {
configCache.set(normalizedKey, value as string);
}
});
return configs;
@@ -189,14 +249,14 @@ export const getCachedConfigs = async (): Promise<Record<string, string>> => {
return cachedConfigs;
}
return await fetchPublicConfigs();
return await fetchPublicBrandConfigs();
} catch {
// API失败时返回缓存的数据
if (hasCachedData) {
return cachedConfigs;
}
return await fetchPublicConfigs();
return await fetchPublicBrandConfigs();
}
};
@@ -255,7 +315,17 @@ export const updateSiteConfig = async (configMap?: Record<string, string>) => {
const resolvedConfigMap = configMap ?? (await getCachedConfigs());
Object.entries(resolvedConfigMap).forEach(([key, value]) => {
configCache.set(key, String(value));
const normalizedKey = key.trim().toLowerCase();
if (SENSITIVE_CONFIG_KEYS.has(normalizedKey)) {
configCache.remove(normalizedKey);
return;
}
if (shouldPersistConfigKey(normalizedKey)) {
configCache.set(normalizedKey, String(value));
}
});
const hasAppName = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(
+2 -2
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import { Button } from "@/shadcn-bridge/heroui/button";
import { siteConfig } from "@/config/site";
import { VersionFooter } from "@/components/version-footer";
import { BrandLogo } from "@/components/brand-logo";
import { login, LoginData, checkCaptcha, getConfigByName } from "@/api";
import { login, LoginData, checkCaptcha, getPublicConfigByName } from "@/api";
import { writeLoginSession } from "@/utils/session";
import { useWebViewMode } from "@/hooks/useWebViewMode";
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ export default function IndexPage() {
if (checkResponse.data === 0) {
await performLogin();
} else {
const configResp = await getConfigByName("cloudflare_site_key");
const configResp = await getPublicConfigByName("cloudflare_site_key");
if (configResp.code === 0 && configResp.data && configResp.data.value) {
setSiteKey(configResp.data.value);